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THE HONORABLE HAROLD BAER, JR. WITH ARMINDA BEPKO
A Necessary and Proper Role for Federal
Courts in Prison Reform: The Benjamin
v. Malcolm Consent Decrees
This article is dedicated to Judge Morris E. Lasker who began the odyssey upon
which the reader is about to embark.  In the author’s view, to be a good judge
requires some smarts and a lot of hard work.  To be a great judge requires all
that along with the right instincts and the guts to follow them.  Judge Lasker has
it all.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Judge Harold Baer, Jr., graduated magna cum laude and Phi Beta Kappa from
Hobart College in 1954 and from the Yale Law School in 1957.  He was an Assistant United States Attorney in
the Southern District of New York and later the chief of the Criminal Division in that office, a partner in a
Wall Street firm where he specialized in white collar crime defense work, a justice in the New York State
Supreme Court for ten years and currently is, and for the last thirteen years has been, a federal district judge in
the Southern District of New York.  Arminda Bepko graduated from New York Law School, was editor-in-
chief of the New York Law School Law Review, clerked for Judge Baer and is now an associate with Cleary
Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP. Many thanks for invaluable editorial support to Shayna Katz, an intern in
Judge Baer’s Chambers and a New York Law School student, and Jasmine Elwick, Judge Baer’s law clerk.
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“It is said that no one truly knows a nation until one has been inside the jails.  A nation
should not be judged by how it treats its highest citizens, but its lowest ones.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
As Nelson Mandela teaches, prison conditions reflect the core values of a
society and test a nation’s commitment to its self-proclaimed ideals.  Over the
years I have had the opportunity to observe our core values through multiple
lenses—as a citizen, as a lawyer in private practice, as a prosecutor, and as a
judge.  This article chronicles my experience as the judge that oversees the New
York City jails—pursuant to a consent decree entered in 1974—and more specifi-
cally, although not exclusively, a complex of institutions known as Rikers Island2
where the great majority of prisoners are pre-trial detainees.3  The question
presented by this article is whether the federal courts are the appropriate vehicle
to oversee prison reform or whether another branch of government is more ap-
propriate.  I argue that no other branch of government is so constituted as to
generate and maintain the requisite interest and sustained momentum needed to
assure minimal constitutional guarantees for detainees in New York City jails.4
It is in such instances when the legislature and the executive are unable or un-
willing to insure minimal constitutional rights that judicial intervention has
been and should continue to be a viable solution.
Let me say at the outset that my experience has not been a uniform success.
This is borne out by the simple fact that after more than a quarter century of
supervision, problems remain and it has cost the taxpayers (in my opinion at
least) a considerable sum of money.  Nor do I suggest that the apparent failure to
act by the executive and legislative branches is indicative of some general mal-
1. NELSON MANDELA, LONG WALK TO FREEDOM 174–75 (1994).
2. On the East River off the southern edge of the Bronx, Rikers Island originally covered eighty-seven acres
of land and belonged to the Dutch Ryker family.  The Rykers were descendants of Abraham Rycken, a
Dutch settler who moved to Long Island in 1638.  New York City purchased the island from the Ryker
family in 1884 for $180,000 and used it as a jail farm.  During the Civil War, the island was used as a
training ground for African-American regiments.  In 1932, the City opened a jail for men there to replace
its dilapidated one on Blackwell’s (now Roosevelt) Island.  After, in 1954, landfill was added to enlarge
the area of the island to 415 acres, enabling the jail facilities to expand and emerge as the modern day
Rikers Island.  Kodi Barth, A City of Jails, http://www.nyc24.org/2003/islands/zone2/rikershistory.html
(last visited Sept. 15, 2007).
3. Approximately 72 percent of New York City’s inmates are pre-trial detainees. See The Corr. Ass’n of
N.Y., Prisoner Profile (Mar. 2006), http://www.correctionalassociation.org/PVP/publications/pris-
oner_profile_2006.pdf.  “The average daily inmate population of New York City Department of Correc-
tion . . . fluctuates between 13,000 and 18,000.  This is more than the prison population of many state
correctional systems.”  City of N.Y. Dep’t of Corr., Facilities Overview, http://www.nyc.gov/html/doc/
html/about/facilities_overview.shtml (last visited Sept. 15, 2007).
4. The jails in New York City include the Manhattan Detention Complex (capacity 898); Rikers Facilities
(total capacity 15,740); Brooklyn Detention Complex (capacity 759; currently closed); Bronx Detention
Complex (capacity 469; currently closed); Queens Detention Complex (capacity 467; currently closed); and
Vernon C. Bain Center (capacity 870). See City of N.Y. Dep’t of Corr., Facilities Overview, http://
www.nyc.gov/html/doc/html/about/facilities_overview.shtml (last visited Sept. 15, 2007).
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aise.  Rather, I argue that when it comes to institutions such as the New York
City jails and protections for its powerless population, it is unlikely that either of
the other two branches of government are prepared to make such a mission a
priority or to provide the necessary—and sometimes tedious—oversight.  Let
there be no mistake, I am hopeful, and encourage both branches to take a more
active role in the future.  Indeed, this article is written in part to do just that.
Unfortunately, the fact is that legislators are, for the most part, advocates for
their constituents and for causes they choose to champion.  Attention to prisoners
and their rights are not causes high on the list.  This article is also an effort to
catalogue and, to an extent, clarify what the judicial branch has accomplished in
the New York City jails over more than a quarter century, all in an unabashed
effort to support the thesis that such a role for federal courts is necessary and
proper.
The reader must keep in mind that the judiciary does not go looking for
business and did not, as some critics suggest, go looking for the Rikers Island
consent decrees in Benjamin v. Malcolm or to expend the effort and time that it
has required.  The court functions only where a controversy is brought before
it—controversies, by the way, which the parties are unable to resolve amongst
themselves, frequently after seeking intervention from the executive and the leg-
islative branches without success.  My text here is primarily a discussion of a class
action lawsuit initiated by the Legal Aid Society (“LAS”) against the City of New
York (the “City”) on behalf of all pre-trial detainees at the City’s jails and the
resultant consent decrees crafted by the parties.5  At the end of this article the
reader will draw his or her own conclusions as to whether to keep this tool in the
judicial toolshed.  While I have affection for the Rikers consent decrees and the
improvements which have resulted therefrom, the reader should not attribute my
involvement with the decrees as broad support for the correctional philosophy
which produced them in the first place.
Following a brief discussion of the tension between the three branches of
government, the article provides an overview of consent decrees and of the cor-
rectional system in the United States.  Section II chronicles the origins of Benja-
min v. Malcolm presided over by Judge Morris E. Lasker and my involvement
which began in 1994.  Section II goes on to explore what I consider the achieve-
ments accomplished by virtue of the consent decrees’ existence and highlights areas
that continue to need improvement and review.  Drawing upon the collective
experience of the Rikers Island consent decrees, Section III examines the useful-
ness of consent decrees in light of the Prisoner’s Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”),
the usefulness of private settlement agreements, and some possible other avenues
5. The suit was instituted in June 1975 on behalf of all pre-trial detainees at the House of Detention for
Men on Riker’s Island (“HDM”).  The complaint alleged that the conditions under which the plaintiffs
were held were “constitutionally impermissible.”  Benjamin v. Malcolm, 495 F. Supp. 1357, 1359
(S.D.N.Y. 1980).  Trial began in October 1976, and concluded in the spring of 1977. Id .
5
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that might be employed to accomplish at least some of the gains achieved by the
consent decrees.  Section IV picks up where the PLRA left off and discusses the
limitations of the proposed Federal Consent Decree Fairness Act of 2005.  This
legislation further emasculates the federal judiciary’s role in consent decrees.  Fi-
nally, Section V concludes that while consent decrees may not be (and I am sure
they are not) the most cost or time efficient means of institutional dispute resolu-
tion, they continue to be necessary and proper.
A. The Role of the Judiciary in the Governmental Tripartite
Understanding the history of the Rikers consent decrees, critiquing the de-
crees, as well as imagining viable alternatives to them, requires a brief review of
the historical debates and tension surrounding the proper role of the three
branches of government in lawmaking.  Without this historical context, it is
nearly impossible to fully grasp the Rikers decrees or fairly evaluate their utility.
Our nation emerged amidst a continuing debate over the concept of mixed
monarchy.  This controversy over which entity, the King or Parliament, was to
be the final decision maker stretches back before Fulmer and Locke.6  America’s
founding fathers eventually concluded that the way to solve that problem was
with a judicial branch.  Despite some criticism by Jefferson and others, a judicial
branch was crafted and became an integral part of our Constitution.  It emerged
slowly but surely as a coequal, independent third branch of government, much as
Hamilton had envisioned in the Federalist Papers.7
The Constitution established a new form of government with three separate
branches—judicial, executive, and legislative—each vested with different re-
sponsibilities and powers.8  The framers of the Constitution adopted the doctrine
of separation of powers to diffuse government power and protect individual lib-
erties from government encroachment, a direct result of the founders’ experience
with corrupt and overreaching monarchs.  For example, Madison passionately
espoused “the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers
in the same department consists in giving to those who administer each depart-
6. See , e.g., G. Robert Blakey & Brian J. Murray, Threats, Free Speech, and the Jurisprudence of the
Federal Criminal Law, 2002 BYU L. REV. 829, 876 n.130, 940–48 (2002).
7. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). The judiciary was and remains the weaker of the
three branches, as Hamilton pointed out.  Aside from being “the least dangerous,” it will always be that
“the Executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword of the community. The legislature not
only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be
regulated.” Id.
8. See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923) (“To the legislative department has been commit-
ted the duty of making laws; to the executive the duty of executing them; and to the judiciary the duty of
interpreting and applying them in cases properly brought before the courts.”).  Article I of the Constitution
vests all legislative powers in Congress; Article II vests executive power in the presidency; and Article III
vests the judicial power in the federal courts. See U.S. CONST. art. I, II, III.
6
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ment the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroach-
ments of the others.”9
We are instructed from an early age that the legislature makes the laws,
judges interpret those laws, and the executive carries out the laws.  Unfortu-
nately, this lesson is oversimplified and unrealistic.  One scholar has offered a
more realistic explanation for the continued debates and confusion in this area:
The honest assessment is that we have no way to identify the differ-
ences between the powers in contested cases, and we are not likely to
have one soon . . . .  In short, we do not know what balance means,
how to measure it, or how to predict when it might be jeopardized . . . .
Inquiring about inter-branch balance is incoherent because it assumes
that branches of government are unitary entities with cohesive inter-
ests, but that is not true . . . .  [Instead, an] effort to match particular
state powers with particular government decisionmakers must start
with an understanding of how those decisionmakers might exercise that
authority . . . [which] requires a fine-grained-appreciation of those
forces that push and pull government actors in one direction or
another.10
Judicial power, in particular, has been subject to debate and criticism.  From
our earliest history, Hamilton, while seeking the necessary insulation from the
legislature and executive, recognized that “[i]t is impossible to keep the judges too
distinct from every other avocation than that of expounding the laws.”11  Almost
two centuries later in 1967, Justice Harlan echoed Hamilton’s sentiments about
the political realities of government:
From the beginning . . . two views as to the proper role of the Supreme
Court in our governmental system have existed . . . .  The one [view] is
that the Court should stand ready to bring about the needed basic
changes in our society which for one reason or another have failed or
lagged in their accomplishment by other means.  The other [view] is
that such changes are best left to the political process and should not be
undertaken by judges who, as they should be because of their office, are
beyond the reach of political considerations . . . .  There can be little
doubt . . . but that the former, broader role of the Supreme Court is the
one currently in vogue, and that it is resulting in the accomplishment of
basic changes in governmental relationships.12
9. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). See  M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches
in Separation of Powers Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 603, 603 (2001) (“Conventional separation of powers
analysis relies on two mechanisms to achieve and maintain the dispersal of state power: separating legisla-
tive, executive, and judicial power in three different branches and preserving a balance among those
branches.”).
10. Magill, supra note 9, at 604–06.
11. THE FEDERALIST NO. 73 (Alexander Hamilton).
12. Alpheus Thomas Mason, Judicial Activism: Old and New, 55 VA. L. REV. 385, 385–86 (1969).
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Some commentators in the current debate caution against “activist judges”13
who willingly and eagerly encroach on the power of the legislature to promulgate
laws.  In the late eighteenth century Madison wrote, “[w]ere the power of judg-
ing joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed
to arbitrary control, for the judge would then be the legislator. Were it joined to
the executive power, the judge might behave with all the violence of an
oppressor.”14
The question remains:  should courts share with the two politically account-
able arms of government—legislature and executive—a more active role in
shaping law and policy, or should the independent—and, as some might argue,
unaccountable—arm exercise self-restraint and deference to the “legitimate”
policymakers?15   Justice Benjamin Cardozo imagined the necessary balance with
respect to judicial authority vis-a`-vis the other branches this way:
The restraining power of the judiciary does not manifest its chief worth
in the few cases in which the legislature has gone beyond the lines that
mark the limits of discretion.  Rather shall we find its chief worth in
making vocal and audible the ideals that might otherwise be silenced,
in giving them continuity of life and of expression, in guiding and
directing choice within the limits where choice ranges.16
Ironically, the judiciary has been subject to criticism for the same reason it is
revered—its lack of direct accountability to the American people.  While the legis-
lature and executive, at least arguably, can and have been influenced by special
interests, the federal judiciary, again, at least arguably, is properly insulated to
protect the interests of the vulnerable and powerless, such as the men and women
who populate our prisons.
B. A Brief History of Consent Decrees
To understand and to judge my role in the Rikers Island consent decrees, one
must also review the development and nature of consent decrees as tools of dis-
pute resolution.  Black’s Law Dictionary defines a “consent decree” as “a court
decree [or order] that all parties agree to.”17  Consent decrees18 have been de-
scribed as a “tension-ridden” cross between private contracts and court-ordered
13. Notably, judicial activism is non-partisan and can restrict freedoms or enlarge them. See id. at 387.
14. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison) (emphasis omitted).
15. The battle between formalism, on one hand, and functionalism exists not only among the branches but also
within the judiciary itself. See , e.g., Mason, supra note 12 (tracing the shifting ideology defining the
Supreme Court and its jurisprudence).
16. JUSTICE BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 94 (1921).
17. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 419 (7th ed. 1999).
18. Etymologically, “consent decree,” or “consent judgments,” reflect a tension between orders traditionally
issued by courts of equity (decrees) and courts of law (judgments).  Judith Resnik, Judging Consent, 1987
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 43, 45 (1987).
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adjudication within which the judge is uniquely and controversially positioned.19
Agreed-upon judgments trace their roots to the English common law and have
taken many forms (and names) in their evolution.20  For example, Pollack and
Maitland describe the judicial role in the institution of “fines”21 after 1175 A.D.
as a mix of private party negotiation of the fines—where the parties were obli-
gated to perform under threat of suit and imprisonment—and judicial blessing of
that “compromise,” often only with a cursory review of the agreement for “facial
defects.”22
In time, judges had more than the early pro forma facial review of private
agreements at common law—e.g., they would hold hearings on the facts or valid-
ity of the agreements or review the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.  Even then
however, courts made “no judicial inquiry into, or preliminary adjudication of,
the facts or applicable law thereto.”23  In other words, there was no judicial re-
view of the underlying merits.  However, the court’s approval of the private
agreement rendered it a “judgment” and carried the associated rights and obliga-
tions.  The entry of a consent decree effectively opened the door to future judicial
intervention and involvement.
A review of United States’ legal history shows that courts “generally as-
sumed the availability of consent decrees without much analysis of why courts
provided them.”24  Instead of judicial legitimacy to oversee consent decrees, the
debate focused on the nature of the consent decree as a “judicial act” versus a
private contract.25   Early treatises teach that consent decrees were the preferred
method of dispute resolution in matrimonial disputes,26 antitrust actions,27 pat-
19. The literature on the “hybrid” nature of consent decrees is voluminous and will not be repeated here. See ,
e.g. , id. (exploring the theoretical basis for judicial action premised on consent decrees and the practical
effects of such decrees).
20. See id. at 50–54 (discussing FREDRICK POLLOCK AND FREDRIC MAITLAND, 2 THE HISTORY OF EN-
GLISH LAW 94–97 (1898)).
21. “Seisin under a fine” was the “final concord levied in the king’s court,” negotiated by the parties and
“accepted” by the court.  Thus, “fines” were similar to the modern court order. Id. (citations omitted).
22. Id. at 52.
23. Id. at 54 (citing A.C. FREEMAN, A TREATISE OF THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 1350 at 2773 (5th ed.
1925)).
24. Id. at 52.
25. Id. at 52–53; see , e.g., 1 JOHN BOUVIER, BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY AND CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA
805 (1914) (“A consent decree binds only the consenting parties; and is not binding upon the court.  It
cannot be modified without consent, even at the same term; and the consent may be withdrawn before
entry.”) (citations omitted).
26. BOUVIER, supra note 25, at 1474 (“In the absence of fraud a consent decree is binding on a married
woman . . . .”) (citations omitted).
27. GEORGE W. STOCKING & MYRON W. WATKINS, CARTELS IN ACTION: CASE STUDIES IN INTERNA-
TIONAL BUSINESS DIPLOMACY 106 (1946).
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ent infringement,28 and fair labor enforcement.29  By 1910, the modern concept
of a consent decree took shape:
One entered by consent of the parties; it is not properly a judicial sen-
tence, but is in the nature of a solemn contract or agreement of the
parties made under sanction of the court, and in effect, an admission by
them that the decree is a just determination of their rights upon the
real facts of the case, if such facts had been proved.30
This characterization reflects the tension between private contract and judicial
adjudication.
A review of Supreme Court jurisprudence traces the development of the
judicial role with respect to the entry and enforcement of consent decrees.  For
example, while consent decrees were generally unappealable at English common
law, United States courts have adopted a more liberal approach to judicial re-
view of consent decrees.31  By the 1960s, in the context of civil rights and ex-
panding administrative agency regulation over corporations, the Supreme Court
recognized the limits of the parties’ control over the consent decree:
28. EDWIN BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 814 (2d ed. 1941); see also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, 2 INVESTIGATION OF GOVERNMENT PATENT PRACTICES AND POLICIES 350 (Hein & Co. 1978)
(1947) (discussing U.S. v. Standard Oil, Civ. No. 2091 (D. N.J. Mar. 25, 1942) and resultant consent
decree).
29. See  Robert H. Jackson, Final Report of the Att’y General’s Comm. on Admin. Proc. 305–06 (1941),
available at http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/pdfdownload/1941appendixD.pdf (last visited Sept.
15, 2007) (explaining that, for the purpose of enforcing the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Wage and Hour
Division of the U.S. Department of  Labor is “authorized to negotiate for the entry of a consent decree
providing restitution to the underpaid employees” in certain cases).
30. HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, A LAW DICTIONARY CONTAINING DEFINITIONS OF THE TERMS AND
PHRASES OF AMERICAN AND ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE, ANCIENT AND MODERN AND INCLUDING THE
PRINCIPAL TERMS OF INTERNATIONAL, CONSTITUTIONAL, ECCLESIASTICAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW,
AND MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE, WITH A COLLECTION OF LEGAL MAXIMS, NUMEROUS SELECT TITLES
FROM THE ROMAN, MODERN CIVIL, SCOTCH, FRENCH, SPANISH, AND MEXICAN LAW, AND OTHER
FOREIGN SYSTEMS, AND A TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS 339 (2d ed.) (1910).
31. Compare Thompson v. Maxwell, 95 U.S. 391, 397 (1877) (citing the English common law rule that,
where, in a case where a consent decree is challenged by a party, “against such a decree a bill of review
will not lie.”) with Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 323–24 (1928) (“Under the English
practice a consent decree could not be set aside by appeal or bill of review, except in case of clerical error.
In this Court a somewhat more liberal rule has prevailed.  Decrees entered by consent have been reviewed
upon appeal or bill of review where there was a claim of lack of actual consent to the decree as entered, or
of fraud in its procurement, or that there was lack of federal jurisdiction because of the citizenship of the
parties.  But ‘a decree, which appears by the record to have been rendered by consent, is always affirmed,
without considering the merits of the cause.’ ”) (internal citations omitted). See also Pac. R.R. v.
Ketchum, 101 U.S. 289, 295 (1880) (“If, when the case gets here, it appears that the decree appealed from
was assented to by the appellant, we cannot consider any errors that may be assigned which were in law
waived by the consent, but we must still receive and decide the case.  If all the errors complained of come
within the waiver, the decree below will be affirmed, but only after hearing.  We have, therefore, jurisdic-
tion of this appeal.”).
10
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The parties cannot, by giving each other consideration, purchase from a
court of equity a continuing injunction.  In a case like this the District
Court’s authority to adopt a consent decree comes only from the statute
which the decree is intended to enforce.  Frequently of course the terms
arrived at by the parties are accepted without change by the adopting
court.  But just as the adopting court is free to reject agreed-upon terms
as not in furtherance of statutory objectives, so must it be free to modify
the terms of a consent decree when a change in law brings those terms
in conflict with statutory objectives . . . .  The court must be free to
continue to further the objectives of [a statute] when its provisions are
amended.  The parties have no power to require of the court continuing
enforcement of rights the statute no longer gives.32
Thereafter, the consent decree became a powerful tool of enforcement of statutory
and constitutional rights of individuals and, increasingly, classes of affected indi-
viduals, particularly in the areas of school desegregation, mental health, prison
reform, environmental, and antitrust litigation.33   Modern Supreme Court ju-
risprudence holds that consent decrees today are generally valid, although limited
32. System Fed’n No. 91 Ry. Employees’ Dep’t v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 652–53 (1961); see also United
States. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244, 248 (1968) (“Swift teaches that a decree may be
changed upon an appropriate showing, and it holds that it may not be changed in the interests of the
defendants if the purposes of the litigation as incorporated in the decree (the elimination of monopoly and
restrictive practices) have not been fully achieved.”); Columbia Artists Mgmt. v. United States., 381 U.S.
348, 352 (1965) (“While the Court has allowed modifications in consent decrees upon occasion, a showing
of changed circumstances is usually necessary. Whether a modification of the consent decree was proper in
this case, where no changed circumstances were claimed, should not be determined by this Court summa-
rily.”) (internal citations omitted).
33. While it existed as a concept as early as the twelfth century in English law (see  Raymond B. Marcin,
Searching for the Origin of the Class Action, 23 CATH. U. L. REV. 515, 521 (1974) (stating the
earliest consumer class action was the English Channel Islands Case in 1309)), it was not until 1937 that
the class action took its present form or close to it with the enactment of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.  At its nascence, Rule 23 was substantially a restatement of the older equity laws, which
left vague and unanswered many of the problems that plagued earlier class actions such as notice, opt out
provisions, and judgment requirements which have been largely rectified though not completely by subse-
quent amendments. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes; FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2) & (3)
(providing, respectively, that the judgment is binding, and that class members have the option to opt out).
Class actions protect the rights of the less fortunate in our society. Cf. United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).  Put simply, class actions are not always vehicles, as some say, to line
lawyers’ pockets.  They may serve the traditional ends of justice through challenges to public institutions.
John Bronsteen & Owen Fiss, The Class Action Rule, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1419, 1421 (2003)
(describing the “social importance of the class action: [i]n some instances, most notably where great social
harm is dispersed among countless individuals, the class action is the only mechanism by which our legal
system can redress a large-scale public wrong”).  Further, “although permitting interest representation
denies absent class members formal access to the courts, rejecting that form of representation renders the
legal system powerless to perform its most important function—holding accountable the party responsible
for a great social harm.” Id. In general, these are institutions in critical need of legislative and executive
attention but have failed to receive the attention they deserve.  Voters, and frequently their representa-
tives, are rarely concerned with the dignity of the mentally infirm or other “unsavory” members of the
community who depend on government institutions for their survival.  As a consequence, and at times by
default, the courts have provided societal minorities with a mechanism which allows them a way to speak
11
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depending on the substantive area,34 and embody principles of contracts and
judgments.35
Finally, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are silent with respect to “con-
sent decrees” and the process of entry or enforcement.  The closest reference is a
discussion under Rules 54 and 58 of the “entry of judgment” but there is no
discussion of entry of judgments by consent.36  With this overview of the history
and landscape of consent decrees, I turn to a brief historical overview of our
federal correctional system, the second component required before our journey into
the world of New York City prison reform and the Rikers consent decrees.
C. Overview of the Correctional System
America has never been in the forefront of prison reform, nor is it known
for its enlightened treatment of convicted felons or detainees.37  In colonial times,
there were hardly any prisons and certainly none resembling what we think of
when we think of prisons today.38  Prisons did not begin to appear until well into
with one voice—to supply a voice for those with no voice. One might suppose this would prompt universal
applause; unfortunately, and for several understandable reasons, this is not always the case.
34. For example, as will be discussed later in this article, the Prison Litigation Reform Act limited the use of
consent decrees and modification of existing consent decrees in the prison reform context.
35. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 437 (2004) (“Consent decrees entered in federal court must be directed to
protecting federal interests.”); Lawyer v. Dep’t of Justice, 521 U.S. 567, 580 n.6 (1997) (“[I]t is the
parties’ agreement that serves as the source of the court’s authority to enter any [consent] judgment at all.”)
(internal citation and quotation omitted); Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 378
(1992) (describing a consent decree as the “embod[iment of] an agreement of the parties” and also “an
agreement that the parties desire and expect will be reflected in, and be enforceable as, a judicial decree
that is subject to the rules generally applicable to other judgments and decrees.”); Firefighters v. Cleve-
land, 478 U.S. 501, 519, 525 (1986) (stating that consent decrees have elements of both contracts and
judicial decrees and must stem from and serve to resolve a dispute within the court’s subject-matter juris-
diction, must come within the general scope of the case made by the pleadings, and must further the
objectives of the law upon which the complaint was based) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
36. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(a) (“ ‘Judgment’ as used in these rules includes a decree and any order from which an
appeal lies. A judgment shall not contain a recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of
prior proceedings.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 58(a) (“(1) Every judgment and amended judgment must be set forth
on a separate document, but a separate document is not required for an order disposing of a motion: (A) for
judgment under Rule 50(b); (B) to amend or make additional findings of fact under Rule 52(b); (C) for
attorney fees under Rule 54; (D) for a new trial, or to alter or amend the judgment, under Rule 59; or (E)
for relief under Rule 60.”).
37. See , e.g., JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE
BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 193–94 (2003) (providing an overview of prison reform in the United
States, Germany, and France).
38. “The early colonial criminal law was a curious mix of religion, English barbarity, and pragmatism.  The
relatively small populations of the early American colonies probably determined much of the character of
criminal law.”  Matthew W. Meskell, Note, An American Resolution: The History of Prisons in the
United States from 1777 to 1877, 51 STAN. L. REV. 839, 841 (1999).  As a result of such low colonial
population, colonists could not afford to institutionalize punishment and, instead, turned to the local relig-
ious institutions to met out punishment in the form of public humiliation, corporal tortures, or “prolonged
humiliation.” Id.
12
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the eighteenth century.  This is not to say the colonists had no philosophy about
crime and how to handle perpetrators.  In essence, criminal punishment was
quick and severe and then complete.  There was no thought that men and women
who had committed a crime could or should be rehabilitated and go on to live
useful lives.  In fact, largely based on the disutility of formalized prisons, the
colonial system of punishment was one of deterrence, not reformation.39  For ex-
ample, branding on the forehead was a frequent penalty for a first offense; death
for a third.40
In the early eighteenth century, as a consequence (at least in part) of popula-
tion growth and European influences, we saw the beginnings of our prison sys-
tem in what were characterized as county jails.  Prisoners were placed in rooms
or perhaps in a single room; there were no cells and there was no effort to distin-
guish between or separate men, women, or children.41  For some time and cer-
tainly into the second decade of the eighteenth century, while there was capital
punishment for murder, many other serious crimes, including arson, rape and
burglary, exacted the forfeiture of property, restitution, and relatively brief terms
of imprisonment.  From the very beginning, conditions in our prisons were
marked by overcrowding, fire hazards, and poor sanitation.
Later in the eighteenth century, in what is known as the Age of Enlighten-
ment in Europe, the concept of “correctional” reform began to emerge.  At the
same time, the hazards of prison life became known and changes began to take
place.42  In his volume, John Howard caught the public’s attention with his de-
tailed discussion of the inhuman conditions prevalent in most jails and prisons.
The same kinds of problems emerged from Howard’s inspection as had plagued
the prison business from its earliest days.  Such issues included poor food or no
food, poor ventilation which prompted an increased risk of fire, little or no medi-
cal attention, and overcrowding.43
Following the American Revolution, our nation embraced the changes
brought by the Enlightenment in Europe, including attention to correctional re-
39. Id. at 842.
40. “Colonials punished offenders increasingly harshly for repeat crimes and ‘those who were raised within the
community yet persisted in recidivating would, if not banished first, inevitably earn a trip to the gal-
lows.’ ” Id.
41. The Romans, for example, had well defined systems of prisons that separated prisoners based on gender
and the nature of the crime committed. NORMAN BRUCE JOHNSTON, THE HUMAN CAGE: A BRIEF
HISTORY OF PRISON ARCHITECTURE 5 (1973).
42. Prisons were initially designed to hold prisoners in large rooms, which from the onset made policing
particularly difficult.  While English single cell formation did influence particular prisons, overall, most
prisons followed the large holding room system.  Early prison reform efforts were strengthened by a string
of riots and escapes (or failed escape plots) and a fear for public safety.  Meskell, supra note 38, at 850.
43. JOHN HOWARD, THE STATE OF PRISONS (Professional Books Ltd., 1977) (1777).
13
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form and to prison conditions.44  Correctional reforms began to appear in state
codes and the theory of reform based on rehabilitation replaced earlier thinking
devoted almost exclusively to retribution and incapacitation.  The modern prison
emerged during the early decades of the nineteenth century and incarceration was
viewed as simply one of several correctional goals.  Unfortunately, the advent of
the modern prison and improved prison conditions, as one author suggests:
[S]imply moved corporal punishment indoors where, hidden from pub-
lic view, it became even more savage . . . . For the most part, the
general public did not know what went on behind prison walls.  But it
regarded the prison as a form of punishment and believed that the
undesirables confined there deserved whatever they got.45
Towards the middle of the nineteenth century, reform concepts such as pa-
role and the indeterminate sentence emerged and became important correctional
tools.46  The widening use of conditional release and parole reduced prison popu-
lations and at the same time were proven in some studies to deter recidivism.47
Since parole was conditioned on evidence of good behavior and rehabilitation,
prisoners were frequently motivated to participate in educational and other pro-
grams which might accelerate their release.48  Parole and conditional release pro-
grams continued until the 1980s when, in the federal system, Congress abolished
parole and many educational opportunities were curtailed or eliminated alto-
44. America’s victory over the British in the Revolutionary War juxtaposed with its exposure to the emerging
scholars of the Enlightenment like Montesquieu, Bentham, and Blackstone forged a new perspective on
criminal punishment based on reason and humanity.  Meskell, supra note 38, at 843.
45. SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE 70 (1980); see also Meskell, supra note 38, at 859–60 (describing
how by 1840 in the face of growing population, “the American public’s exposure to internal prison life
declined steadily and consequently the plight of prisoners was not in the public mind”).  It was not until
Enoch Wines and Theodore Dwight focused attention on penitentiaries in their report to the New York
legislature in 1867 that the public was exposed to the internal accounts of health conditions, descriptions of
punishment tactics, and rehabilitation efforts with “no small amount of editorializing.” Id.  The Report
concluded that “there is not a prison system in the United States, which tried . . . would not be found
wanting.” Id . at 860 (citation omitted).
46. See JONATHAN SIMON, POOR DISCIPLINE: PAROLE AND THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF THE UNDERCLASS,
1890–1990 39–40 (1994) (describing the development of disciplinary parole: “First, labor for modern
Westerners is the essential feature of being normal . . . .  Second, labor is punitive . . . .  Third, labor is a
potent means of social control.” (internal citations omitted)).
47. Historically, the rehabilitation and reintegration of the parolee into society were the goals of the parole
system; goals not necessarily reflected in the modern system. FREDERICK A. HUSSEY & DAVID E. DUF-
FEE, PROBATION, PAROLE, AND COMMUNITY FIELD SERVICES: POLICY, STRUCTURE, AND PROCESS 61
(1980).
48. However, in the mid-nineteenth century, “[f]ew prisons provided educational facilities and, even when
available, prisoners rarely received time to learn basic skills.”  Meskell, supra note 38, at 860 (citation
omitted).
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gether, and the thrust of the federal correctional effort was directed primarily
towards incarceration.49
Reforms—particularly new alternatives to incarceration—were initiated at
or shortly after the dawn of the twentieth century.  New programs included com-
munity service and work release, amongst others.50  The latter first became law
in Wisconsin in 1913 and worked its way east.  A work release bill was enacted
into law in New York State some half century later, in 1967, and the work
release program began in 1970.51  Work release programs permit prisoners near
the end of their terms to work during the day and return to their cell in the
evening so as to earn some money, have the opportunity to learn a skill, and to
ease their readjustment back into the community.52  In spite of the availability of
such programs, the rise of organized crime and the accompanying violence of the
49. However, according to the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 3583, the purpose of supervised release is to
provide rehabilitation to a defendant following a term of imprisonment:
[T]he primary goal of . . . [supervised release] is to ease the defendant’s transition into the
community after the service of a long prison term for a particularly serious offense, or to
provide rehabilitation to a defendant who has spent a fairly short period in prison for
punishment or other purposes but still needs supervision and training programs after
release.
S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 124 (1983), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3307.  In fact, prior to the
promulgation of Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987), federal sentencing
was indeterminate and bifurcated—judges had broad discretion to sentence a convicted person with a
range prescribed by statute, and were assisted by the United States Parole Commission in determining
“when an offender was sufficiently rehabilitated to be released.”  Bryan R. Diederich, Note, Risking
Retroactive Punishment: Modification of the Supervised Release Statute and the Ex Post Facto
Prohibition, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1551, 1554–60 (1999) (chronicling the history of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h)
regarding supervised and conditional release).
50. See  Daniel Weiss, Note, California’s Inequitable Parole System: A Proposal to Reestablish Fairness,
78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1584–87 (2005) (outlining the history of the parole and work release systems in
the United States);
Not surprisingly, the role played by parole in the correctional system has changed substan-
tially over the twenty years since Morrissey was decided. Parole no longer is employed as a
vehicle for rehabilitation services. States now use parole primarily as a low-cost alternative
to prison and use the parole revocation process to preventively detain parolees for weeks or
months. States also are implementing more restrictive forms of conditional release which
blur the sharp line Morrissey drew for due process purposes between the tight restrictions
of imprisonment and the relatively high degree of freedom enjoyed by the parolee.
Thomas J. Bamonte, The Viability of Morrissey v. Brewer and the Due Process Rights of Parolees
and Other Conditional Releases, 18 S. ILL. U. L. J. 121, 124–28 (1993).
51. See  Sara Feldschreiber, Note, Fee at Last?  Work Release Participation Fees and the Takings
Clause, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 207, 214–19 (2003) (chronicling the history of the work release statute in
New York); see also id. at 215 (“The New York program has proven successful; the most recent study
found that only eight percent of work release participants returned to jail compared to a twenty-seven
percent rate of return among those inmates who did not participate in work release.”) (citation omitted).
52. In general, temporary release programs strive “to reduce recidivism by helping inmates to return to a
normal and productive life.” Id. at 214–15 (discussing New York release programs); see also Ortiz v.
Wilson, 448 N.Y.S.2d 918, 919 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1981) (finding that the purpose of a temporary
release program is to “reduce recidivism by helping inmates to return to a normal and productive life”).
15
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1920s and the 1930s brought a new “get tough” policy, which has largely contin-
ued through the present day.53  Yet I hesitate to generalize since at different times
during the last half century, some states at least have adopted reforms and im-
proved prison conditions dramatically.
Clearly, prison conditions have markedly improved since the revelations of
the early twentieth century,54 and I believe that those changes, especially those
within the last quarter century, are in some measure attributable to consent de-
crees of the type entered into between New York City and the Legal Aid Society
on behalf of its detainees.55  That said, New York State and, to a degree, the
federal government, have over the past quarter century adopted a correction pol-
icy focused on legislating new crimes, longer terms, and incarceration and not
rehabilitation.56  This policy has been accompanied by increasing public ambiva-
53. But see Chris Suellentrop, The Right Has a Jailhouse Conversion, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2006, §6
(Magazine), at 47 (noting that Republicans have taken up traditionally Democratic agendas such as
housing and job training for ex-offenders).
54. As Oklahoma Commissioner of Charities and Corrections, Kate Barnard inspected a Kansas penitentiary
where Oklahoma prisoners were confined in 1908.  Her report to the Oklahoma governor exposed brutali-
ties in the Kansas prison system and led to an investigation that sustained her charges.  See Oklahoma
Dep’t of Corrections, Oklahoma Department of Corrections: The 20th Century, at ¶1 (2002), http://
www.doc.state.ok.us/newsroom/publications/DOC%20History.htm; see also HELEN CHRISTINE BEN-
NETT, AMERICAN WOMEN IN CIVIC WORK 106–07 (1915).
55. See , e.g., John J. Dilulio, Jr., Conclusion, What Judges Can Do to Improve Prisons and Jails, in
COURTS, CORRECTIONS, AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL INTERVENTION ON PRIS-
ONS AND JAILS 287, 291 (John J. Dilulio, Jr. ed. 1990).
[I]f the question is one of net assessment, then the impact of judicial intervention into
prisons and jails over the last two decades has been positive—a qualified success, but a
success just the same.  For proponents of judicial restraint, there is no use denying that in
most cases levels of order, amenity, and service in prisons and jails have improved as a
result of judicial intervention.  And in most cases it is equally futile to assert that such
improvements would have been made, or made as quickly, in the absence of judicial
intervention.
Id. at 291.
56. Scholars and courts over the past twenty years have examined the successes and failures of different aspects
of the New York prison system. See , e.g., Jennifer R. Wynn and Alisa Szatrowski, The Modern Ameri-
can Penal System: Hidden Prisons: Twenty-Three-Hour Lockdown Units in New York State Cor-
rectional Facilities, 24 PACE L. REV. 497, 525 (2004) (“Our research based on site visits to nearly every
lockdown unit in the New York State prison system gives grim testimony to the serious problems that exist
in these facilities.  Findings reveal significant numbers of inmates suffering from mental illness as evi-
denced by the high rates of self-mutilation, suicide attempts and psychiatric hospitalizations, a paradigm
that stresses punishment over treatment and a demoralized correctional staff.” (citation omitted)); James
R.P. Ogloff et al., Mental Health Services in Jails and Prisons: Legal, Clinical, and Policy Issues, 18
LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 109, 112–15 (1994) (describing a study involving 3684 offenders incarcerated
in New York prisons, which found that 8 percent were suffering from severe psychiatric or functional
disabilities of the severity ordinarily found among patients in a psychiatric hospital); Scott Burris, Pris-
ons, Law and Public Health: The Case for a Coordinated Response to Epidemic Disease Behind
Bars, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 291 (1992) (criticizing federal and state prison’s treatment of prisoners with
special medical needs and communicable diseases in prisons). See generally, Nolley v. County of Erie, 776
F. Supp. 715, 740 (W.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding that a prison had deprived the plaintiff of a “necessity of
life” by repeatedly failing to provide her with prescribed medication); Spiros A. Tsimbinos, Is It Time To
16
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lence and less attention to prisoners’ rights and prison conditions.57  If proven
effective, it might at least be understandable.  Unfortunately, a primary result of
this policy has been the emergence of a growing industry in the prison construc-
tion business.58  State and federal expense budgets for prisons have never before
reached their current numbers (all paid for by the taxpayer, of course), and a
recent article reports that “[b]y 2005, more than 1.5 million persons were incar-
cerated in U.S. prisons on any given day, and an additional 750,000 were incar-
cerated in local jails.”59
II. THE BENJAMIN CONSENT DECREES
With this background, I turn to the evolution of conditions in New York
City detention facilities and theories of criminal detention, the catalysts for the
Benjamin consent decrees.
A. Rhem v. McGrath
The “Tombs,”60 later known as the Manhattan House of Detention for
Men, was described in 1871 as follows:
Change the Rockefeller Drug Laws?, 13 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL. COMMENT. 613, 624 (1999) (discussing
the effect of the Rockefeller Drug Laws on prisons: “[b]eginning in the late 1970’s, the Legislature realized
that the more stringent drug laws had succeeded only in overcrowding New York prisons to deter drug use
or crime.”).
57. See , e.g., Kristin L. Burns, Note, Return to Hard Time: The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995,
31 GA. L. REV. 879, 880–91 (1997) (describing changes in the public perception of the importance of
prisoners’ rights which, not surprisingly, coincided with the changing of public policy on such rights).
58. See , e.g., J.C. Oleson, Comment, The Punitive Coma, 90 CAL. L. REV. 829, 844–46 (2002) (describing
the ever-rising costs of prisons such that during the last two decades, roughly a thousand new prisons and
jails have been built in the United States) (“[B]etween 1980 and 1994 alone . . .  more than $25 billion
was spent on the capital construction costs of new state and federal prisons, an increase of about 141% over
the level in fiscal year 1980.”) (citations omitted); see also, Vanessa Blum, U.S. Building New Prisons
for Terrorists: Construction of Guantanamo Jails Signals Long-Term Plans for Base, LEGAL
TIMES, Oct. 4, 2004, at 1 (in the context of detainees, noting government plans to build a new permanent
detention facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba). These policies have not only encouraged the construction of
new prisons, but they have also made the prison business profitable for corporate distributors of prison
supplies (food, personal care products, etc.), as well as maximized the profitability of prison labor.  Cynthia
Chandler, Death and Dying in America: The Prison Industrial Complex’s Impact on Women’s
Health, 18 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 40, 46–54 (2003).
59. Don Stemen, Reconsidering Incarceration: New Directions for Reducing Crime, 19 FED. SENT’G
REP. 221, 221 (2007).  The 2007 Budget for the Federal Prison system is approximately $5.1 billion.
Dep’t of Justice, 2007 Budget Highlights, Resources and Key Performance Measures by Strategic Goal,
http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/2007summary/pdf/03_4_15_part1_2007budgethights.pdf (last visited Sept.
15, 2007).
60. The nickname the “Tombs” owes its origins to the fact that the original structure was designed based on an
Egyptian mausoleum. See N.Y. Corr. History Society, A Tale of the Tombs, http://www.correction
history.org/html/chronicl/nycdoc/html/histry3a.html#tale (last visited Sept. 15, 2007).  The nickname
stuck even after the original prison was torn down and rebuilt. Id.
17
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The Tombs!  where living men are buried, and by a refinement of cru-
elty, the living are chained to the dying and the dead, until the whole
becomes one mass of moral putrefaction . . . .
The Tombs!  whence those who were buried, issue forth again, speak-
ing, and moving as men, and bearing the form of humanity; but with
death,—death spiritual and final—with death stamped on their vis-
ages, and reigning in their souls.  These are strong words, but they are
not stronger than the truth requires.61
A century later, the description was no less painful, but the powers that be
in the New York State government had begun to take notice.62  By 1969, the
Tombs were overcrowded and unsanitary, holding an average of 2,000 men in a
facility designed to house 925.63  The situation in the Tombs reflected insufficient
regard for inmates who, in addition to being subject to overcrowding and sanita-
tion problems, endured poorly lit and sometimes freezing, sometimes boiling tem-
peratures, arbitrary disciplinary procedures, along with inadequate medical care,
lack of recreation, and restrictions on visits and mail.  In fact, in November
1969, the New York State Senate Committee on Penal Institutions issued a re-
port that exposed the overcrowded, inadequate Tombs facilities as less humane
than our public zoos.64  Sanitation, or the lack thereof, fueled widespread com-
plaints of rats, roaches, body lice, and lack of soap.65  At this point the facility
reached a breaking point.
In October 1970, riots broke out in the Tombs.66  Detainees captured a
number of prison guards and civilians working in the Tombs, held them as hos-
tages, and threatened to seriously assault and kill them, all to protest against the
deplorable prison conditions at the Tombs and to bring their grievances to the
attention of the authorities and the public.67
61. N.Y. Corr. History Society, A History of the Correctional Society of New York, http://www.correction
history.org/html/chronicl/cany/html/cany04a.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2007) (citation omitted).
62. For example, the Board of Correction came into being on June 25, 1957 when Mayor Robert F. Wagner
signed Local Law No. 25 amending Chapter 25 of the New York City Charter by adding Section 626,
establishing a nine member non-salaried Board of Correction. See Progress Through Crisis: 1954-
1965, at 6–7 (cited at http://www.correctionhistory.org/html/chronicl/bdofcorr/bdofcor.html (last visited
Sept. 15, 2007)).  The stated mission of the Board of Correction was to visit the jails and make recommen-
dations in the interest of the detainees. Id. 
63. N.Y. Corr. History Society, A Tale of the Tombs, http://www.correctionhistory.org/html/chronicl/
nycdoc/html/histry3a.html#tale (last visited Sept. 15, 2007).
64. Peter Kihss, Albany Report Calls Jails ‘Crime Breeding Grounds,’ N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1969, at 30.
65. David Burnham, The Tombs Called ‘Dungeon of Fear,’ N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1970, at 45.  A survey
was conducted by then Manhattan Congressman, Edward I. Koch with the permission of Commissioner
McGrath. Id.
66. People v. Brown, 333 N.Y.S.2d 342, 346 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1972); see also  Rhem v. McGrath, 326
F. Supp. 681, 683–84 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
67. Brown, 333 N.Y.S.2d at 346.  The inmates rioted again in 1971.  The Correctional Society of New York,
The History of the Corr. Society of N.Y.: VIII: The Rockefeller Years and the Crisis of Criminal
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After the October riots, conditions at the Tombs only worsened.68  For ex-
ample, after the riots, all detainees were indefinitely confined to their cells for
what was known as a twenty-four hour “lock in.”69  A series of disintegrating
conditions prompted the Legal Aid Society to file for a preliminary injunction on
behalf of the Tombs’ detainees, and by October 26, 1970, the detainees were certi-
fied as a class in Rhem v. McGrath, a civil rights action brought against the
Department of Correction (“DOC”) and the City.70  In March 1971, Judge Wal-
ter R. Mansfield granted the preliminary injunction in part and (1) ordered the
DOC to adopt, publish, and distribute to all detainees rules governing detainee
behavior and life, and (2) prohibited the DOC from interfering with private
consultations between detainees and their attorneys.71  Shortly thereafter, Judge
Mansfield was appointed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and the case
was reassigned to Judge Morris E. Lasker.72  By August 2, 1973, following a
year of settlement talks and a trial, Judge Lasker entered a consent decree, which
addressed the civil rights issues relating to overcrowding, unsanitary conditions,
and inadequate medical care.73
Judge Lasker issued his first opinion in Rhem on January 7, 1974.74  He
found that the inmates had proven all of their allegations and that “[t]he dismal
Justice Reform, http://www.correctionhistory.org/html/chronicl/cany/html/cany08a.html (last visited
Sept. 15, 2007).
68. Rhem v. McGrath, 326 F. Supp. at  684.
69. Id. The lock-in ended on October 30, 1970. Id. at 685.
70. Id. at 682.  The action alleged that (1) conditions at the Tombs constituted cruel and unusual punishment
in violation of the Eighth Amendment; (2) the practice of opening and inspecting inmates’ incoming mail
was an infringement on their constitutional right to communicate freely with their attorneys; and (3) the
absence of readily-accessible rules and regulations governing the conduct of inmates and correction officers
in the Tombs deprives them of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
71. Id. at 691.  The preliminary injunction also applied to any other case in which the commissioner of
correction, or his staff, was a party. Id.
72. This was not the last of Judge Mansfield’s involvement in the case, however.  As late as 1986, Judge
Mansfield issued decisions in Benjamin as a judge on the Second Circuit. See  Benjamin v. Malcolm, 803
F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1986).
73. Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
74. Id. at 594.  At trial LAS advanced several arguments.  First, they argued that the conditions at the
Tombs violated plaintiffs’ due process rights because, as detainees not yet convicted, the law required that
they be held under the least restrictive conditions necessary. Id. at 600.  In practice, detainees were locked
in their respective cells sixteen hours a day, even though the sole justification for their confinement was to
ensure their appearance at trial.  Approximately 56 percent of detainees sent to jail at arraignment have
bail set at $2,000 or less and about 25 percent have bail set at $500 or less.  Corr. Ass’n of N.Y., Prisoner
Profile , http://www.correctionalassociation.org/PVP/publications/prisoner_profile_2006.pdf.  Second,
LAS asserted a violation of the equal protection clause because the general conditions in the Tombs were
harsher compared to those of convicted prisoners. Id. Third, LAS also argued that the detainees’ Eighth
Amendment rights, individually or collectively, were violated because the conditions at the Tombs consti-
tuted cruel and unusual punishment. Id.  The City defended the conditions as borne of necessity and
argued it was necessary for the inmates to be held in maximum security and the character of the Tombs
was constitutionally justified. Id.
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conditions which still exist in the institution [over three years after the suit was
originally filed] manifestly violate the Constitution and would shock the con-
science of any citizen who knew of them.”75  Judge Lasker opined that “the public
through its government ha[d] not assumed its responsibilities to provide a decent
environment within jail walls.”76  Further, he suggested that “[c]ourts are the
agency which must enforce the execution of public responsibilities when other
branches of government fail to do so: courts sit not to supervise prisons but to
enforce the constitutional rights of all persons, including prisoners.”77
Judge Lasker highlighted the fact that the necessary changes to the Tombs
would cost significant amounts of money and would require deliberate and care-
ful planning by the City.78  Unfortunately, apart from agreeing to redress over-
crowding by instituting population caps at the Tombs, it was quickly apparent
that the City was not about to cooperate.79  For the six months that followed, the
City dragged its feet, sought extensions, and at the end refused to provide any
semblance of a plan—let alone the detailed one sought by the court—to effectuate
the necessary changes.80  As a result of this noncompliance, on July 11, 1974,
Judge Lasker ordered the Tombs closed within thirty days absent a comprehen-
sive and specific plan for the elimination of unconstitutional conditions in the
facility.81
At this time, the City was on the brink of bankruptcy and Mayor Abraham
Beame did not place the City’s jails amongst his priorities for funding or atten-
tion.82  It is fair to say that in this time of budget crisis there were more visible
75. Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. at 636.  The dismal conditions included excessive lock-in time, depriva-
tion of contact visits, dangerously high noise levels, excessive heat, inadequate ventilation, absence of
transparent windows, lack of recreation, excessive use of lock-out areas instead of day areas, programmatic
deficiencies, limited employment activities, mistreatment of inmates due to understaffing of correction
officers, absence of due process and transparency in disciplinary procedures, lack of a detainee classification
system, and inappropriate handling of correspondence. Id. at 594.
76. Id. at 636.
77. Id. (citing Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972) (internal quotations omitted)).
78. Id. at 637.
79. Rhem v. Malcolm, 377 F. Supp. 995, 996 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
80. Id.  In the preceding two years, Judge Lasker had been patient with the City defendants.  He understood
that the City would need to commit a great deal of time and money to effectuate significant change and
practical constraints would prevent change from happening overnight.  That Judge Lasker was frustrated
to the point that he was compelled to order such a drastic measure reflected the unwillingness on the part
of the executive and legislative branches of our City government to, in good faith, attempt to cure the
conditions at the Tombs that violated plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.  Judge Lasker described the history
of the case as “one of frustration largely caused by the City defendants’ delay and the absence or incom-
pleteness of reports or plans of performance which they were ordered to submit.” Id. at 996.
81. Id. at 996–97.
82. Corrections were at the bottom of any agenda in the Beame administration.  Commissioner Benjamin
Malcolm recalled talking to Mayor Beame about some money in his budget to enlarge the kitchen at the
Tombs:
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public needs such as general sanitation, welfare, police, and fire safety.83
The City appealed and the Second Circuit upheld Judge Lasker’s decision
and emphasized the fact that pre-trial detainees, such as those held in the Tombs,
are presumed innocent of the charges against them and are held only for a failure
to make bail.84  The court rejected the City’s fiscal arguments and held that inad-
equate resources did not justify the state’s deprivation of constitutional rights.85
The court added that the facts of the case demanded substantial physical changes
to remedy the constitutional violations.  Further, because the City cited a finan-
cial inability to make any commitments to improve the Tombs, the facts of the
case also warranted a more practical approach to equitable relief.86
Instead of making any improvements, the City decided to close the Tombs,
and by December 20, 1974, the DOC had transferred the Tombs detainees to the
House of Detention for Men (“HDM”) on Rikers Island.87  In an interview,
Judge Lasker stated that he was surprised that the City opted to close the Tombs.
He said: “I didn’t realize how much the City was stonewalling until even after I
issued the order to comply or close down the Tombs . . . .  I thought they would
I went to Deputy Mayor Cavanagh and said that I would like to switch this money and use
it to begin contact visits.  He asked where I got the money, and I said it was in my budget.
He said that he would rather give it to the sanitation department than the prisons.  I
wouldn’t say they were insensitive, but I would say that it just wasn’t one of their priori-
ties.  It never was the whole time . . . . Even when things did not cost much, Beame was
unresponsive.
Ted S. Storey, When Intervention Works: Judge Morris E. Lasker and New York City Jails, in
COURTS, CORRECTIONS, AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL INTERVENTION ON PRIS-
ONS AND JAILS 148 (John J. DiIulio, Jr. ed., 1990) (citing Interview with Benjamin Malcolm, former
New York City commissioner of correction (July 29, 1987)) (omission in original).
83. Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333, 341–42 (2d Cir. 1974).
84. Id. at 336. The court explained:
Over two hundred years ago, Blackstone elegantly stated that pre-trial commitment for
those unable to make bail “is only for safe custody, and not for punishment: therefore, in this
dubious interval between the commitment and the trial, a prisoner ought to be used with
the utmost humanity, and neither be loaded with needless fetters or subjected to other hard-
ships than such as are absolutely requisite for the purpose of confinement only . . . .”
Id. at 342 (internal citations omitted).
85. Id. at 341.
86. Id .  The court stated that for practical purposes, the judiciary should not be in the difficult position of
trying to enforce a direct Order to the City to raise and allocate large sums of money. Id.  Consequently,
on remand, the court ordered Judge Lasker to refashion the equitable relief.  The court suggested that
Judge Lasker’s Order should have been framed to close the prison to detainees or to limit its use for
detainees to certain narrow functions by a fixed date, unless specified standards were met.  Once Judge
Lasker established appropriate standards or permissible limited uses, he would then determine whether
there was compliance by the specified deadline.  If the City failed to satisfy the compliance criteria in time,
Judge Lasker, in his discretion, could postpone the effective date of any Order, but only if clear and
convincing proof of adequate planning and funding of improvements was produced. Id. at 340.
87. Rhem v. Malcolm, 389 F. Supp. 964, 966 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).  The Tombs did not stay closed indefinitely.
By 1983, the Tombs underwent a $42 million renovation project and the facility was reopened.  Philip
Shenon, The Jail Space Shortage Seems Chronic as Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1983, § 4, at 6.
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comply.”88  Unfortunately, moving the pre-trial detainees out of the Tombs did
not solve the issue of substandard housing, rather, it merely transferred the
problems out of Manhattan and onto Rikers Island where the detainees exper-
ienced many of the same atrocious conditions.89  Shortly thereafter, Judge Lasker
issued a ruling and held that the detainees previously housed in the Tombs and
presently housed at HDM were still entitled to the constitutional standards enu-
merated in Rhem.90  Judge Lasker made it clear that as far as the Constitution
was concerned, it made no difference whether the detainees were on Rikers Island
or the island of Manhattan.91
B. Benjamin v. Malcolm
In the fall of 1975, the HDM detainees initiated one of the worst jail riots
in New York City’s history, taking over seven of the eight cellblocks at HDM.92
The uprising cost millions of dollars in physical damages and endangered the
lives of several correction officers who were taken hostage.93  To avoid more riot-
ing, Commissioner Malcolm along with other DOC officials initiated negotia-
tions with the detainees.94  At one point, the detainees asked to speak to Judge
Lasker.95  The riot ended without any fatalities and without much gain for the
inmates.  Serious reforms were still years away.  Mayor Beame visited Rikers
once after the riot.  It was the one and only time he visited during his entire
administration.96
88. Judge Harold Baer, Jr. and Arminda Bepko, Interview with Judge Morris Lasker in Chambers of U.S.
District Court of Massachusetts, Nov. 7, 2005 (recording on file with author) [hereinafter Judge Lasker
Interview].
89. Plaintiffs abandoned their claims with respect to conditions related solely to the physical arrangements at
the Tombs, such as excessive noise and heat and lack of ventilation.  However, the plaintiffs still claimed
their civil rights were violated with respect to excessive lock-in, lack of recreation, lack of contact visits,
inadequate visitation, failure to extend optional lock-in and lack of a detainee classification system.  Rhem
v. Malcolm, 389 F. Supp. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff’d, 527 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1975).
90. Rhem v. Malcolm, 389 F. Supp. at 966–67.
91. Id.
92. In 1975, LAS filed Benjamin v. Malcolm, 495 F. Supp. 1357 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), on behalf of all present
or future detainees at HDM as soon as it became clear that the Rhem  decision only applied to detainees
who had been transferred to Rikers from the Tombs.  The Benjamin complaint was virtually the same as
the one filed in Rhem  and detailed unsanitary living areas and cells, overcrowding, unbearable noise
levels, difficulty and delays with respect to family and attorney visits, and excessive lock-in.  Storey, supra
note 82, at 150.  LAS sought and received a preliminary injunction against the City that would confer the
same rights on the HDM detainees as Rhem  had for the Tombs detainees. Id.
93. Benjamin, 495 F. Supp. at 1360.
94. Storey, supra note 82, at 150.
95. Id. Judge Lasker remembers giving a lecture at the state penitentiary at Green Haven.  After the lecture,
a prisoner introduced himself saying: “Judge, I don’t know if you remember me, but we met at the Rikers
Island riot.” Judge Lasker Interview, supra note 88.
96. Storey, supra note 82, at 150.
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The trial in the Benjamin case began in 1976 and was completed the fol-
lowing year.97  While the lawsuit was sub judice, Edward Koch was elected
mayor, and by all accounts, his administration was the first to initiate some of the
much needed improvements to the City’s jails.98  In contrast to the Beame admin-
istration, Mayor Koch preferred a negotiated settlement, so he asked Judge
Lasker to withhold his decision on the pending issues while the parties negoti-
ated.99  Judge Lasker agreed and entered an order that he would stay a decision
while the parties negotiated.100
To understand the political landscape, it is worth noting that Commissioner
Malcolm and his successors were frequently in an awkward position.  While they
were appreciative of the involvement of the judiciary as an effective enforcer of
change, at the same time, they served at the pleasure of the mayor.101  However,
it should be noted that although the commissioner of correction and his depart-
ment were the named defendants,102 reforms were typically negotiated by City
officials who were not always realistic about timeframes and who could be tight-
fisted when it came to the allocation of funds.103
The newly-elected mayor appointed Alan Schwartz, his former law partner,
to be his corporation counsel, and negotiations began in earnest.104  In the fall of
1978 a detailed fifty-page consent decree was signed by all participants, which
covered all of the City’s jails at Rikers Island, Brooklyn, the Bronx, and
Queens.105  By the spring of 1979 Judge Lasker approved and entered the Partial
97. Benjamin v. Malcolm, 564 F. Supp. 668, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
98. See  Storey, supra note 82, at 152.  This new approach was exemplified when Mayor Koch went to Rikers
Island on Christmas Day before he took office to share a holiday meal with correction officers and inmates.
Id. at 153.  The mayor also reemphasized his new approach in a 1978 speech, stating that the City
“accept[s] our responsibility for maintaining jails that are humane and meet constitutional requirements.”
Id. 
99. Id. at 152–53; see also Benjamin v. Malcolm, 495 F. Supp. 1357, 1359 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
100. Benjamin, 495 F. Supp. at 1359.
101. Commissioner Malcolm said that in the beginning of the litigation he thought Lasker was going too far,
but as the litigation progressed, his “early view of Lasker as a judge overstepping his boundary changed to
that of a judge who had the guts and courage to stand up and keep the system in line.”  Storey, supra note
82, at 152 (internal citations omitted).
102. Benjamin, 495 F. Supp. 1357 (defendants Benjamin J. Malcolm, Commissioner of Correction of the City
of New York; Arthur Rubin, Warden, New York City House of Detention for Men; Gerard Brown,
Deputy Warden, New York City House of Detention for Men; and Abraham D. Beame, Mayor of the
City of New York, individually and in their official capacities).
103. Mayor Koch appointed a new Commissioner, William Ciuros, Jr., but his tenure lasted a short nineteen
months. See Storey, supra note 82, at 153.
104. Id. 
105. Benjamin v. Malcolm, 803 F.2d 46, 48 (2d Cir. 1986).  The decree involved six additional related cases:
Forts v. Malcolm, 156 F.R.D. 561 (New York City Correctional Institute for Women), Ambrose v. Mal-
colm, 156 F.R.D. 561 (Bronx House of Detention for Men), Maldonado v. Ciuros, 156 F.R.D. 561
(Adolescent Reception and Detention Center), Detainees of the Brooklyn House of Detention for Men v.
Malcolm, 156 F.R.D. 561, Detainees of the Queens House of Detention for Men v. Malcolm, 156 F.R.D.
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Final Judgment by Consent.106  This was the beginning of an association be-
tween the federal judiciary and New York City’s DOC that would span four
decades, six mayors, sixteen commissioners of corrections,107 two federal district
court judges, and frequently the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.  As might be
expected, agreement to the changes in principle came much faster than their exe-
cution.  For example, many of the provisions required compliance within eigh-
teen to twenty-four months.  This timetable proved to be unrealistic.108
There were many obstacles to implementation in the beginning that in-
cluded allocation of funds in the budget and the development of policies for the
treatment of inmates by corrections officers—a far longer-term goal than chang-
ing written policies.  Overcrowding remained an issue, although the population
in the jails had fluctuated wildly below and above the inmate cap.109  This over-
crowding, at least in part, was the result of the larger-than-usual number of
convicted state prisoners in the City’s correctional facilities because the state was
slow to move them out or because they were charged with violating parole, picked
up in New York City, and held on Rikers.110  Despite other improvements, the
overcrowding continued and LAS moved for a judgment to grant “relief for un-
constitutional overcrowding” and to reduce the population at HDM to one thou-
sand inmates.111  Judge Lasker, in his first opinion in Benjamin v. Malcolm,
cited a long history of studies of HDM, and concluded that the facility had been
dangerously overcrowded for years.112  Judge Lasker granted plaintiffs’ motion
and capped the HDM population at 1,200.113
Thereafter, the overcrowding persisted and Judge Lasker revisited the issue
on several occasions.114  He concluded that an increase in the detainee population
561, Rosenthal v. Malcolm, 156 F.R.D. 561 (Adult Mental Health Center on Rikers  Island). See  Ben-
jamin v. Fraser, 161 F. Supp. 2d 151, 153 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).  The cases were consolidated before Judge
Lasker in 1982.  Benjamin v. Fraser, 343 F.3d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 2003).
106. Benjamin v. Malcolm, 803 F.2d 46, 48 (2d Cir. 1986).
107. N.Y. Corr. History Society, NYC Corrections Commissioners: Since 1896, http://www.correction
history.org/html/chronicl/nycdoc/html/comslist.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2007) (including acting commis-
sioners of corrections).
108. Benjamin Ward replaced Ciuros as commissioner of correction and was charged with most of the responsi-
bility for implementing the Decrees. Id.
109. Benjamin v. Malcolm, 495 F. Supp. 1357, 1361 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
110. Id. at 1362.
111. Id. at 1360.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1365.
114. For example, in July 1981, in an effort to rectify the overcrowding, the City moved for an Order to
compel the New York State Department of Correction Services to remove all sentenced inmates from the
City’s detention facilities, as required by New York Criminal Procedure Law Section 430.20. See Benja-
min v. Malcolm, 528 F. Supp. 925, 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).  The City first moved to join the governor of
New York and the state as defendants in August 1980.  The City argued that the state was obligated
under Section 430.20 of the New York Criminal Procedure Law to remove “forthwith” from City facili-
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would put additional pressure on an already overextended medical care system
that was plagued by frequent emergencies and inadequate infirmary space.115  In
a denial of one of the City’s motions to increase population cap, Judge Lasker
astutely observed:
[I]n view of the history of this litigation, it would not be appropriate
simply to assume that, if defendants’ application were granted subject
to court-ordered conditions, those conditions would be met, or continue
to be met in the future.  Defendants have been subject to court orders
for many years, and all of the parties to this lawsuit know through
frustrating experience that the entry of an order does not guarantee its
timely observance.116
This would become a common theme throughout the enforcement of the Benja-
min consent decrees.
C. Creation of the Office of Compliance Consultants
Judge Lasker’s June 1982 Order created the Office of Compliance Consul-
tants (“OCC”).117  At its inception, the OCC was to mimic some characteristics of
a special master, but would be neither a creature of the court, the City, nor the
DOC.118  The OCC’s budget is paid by the City.119  The OCC staff members120
ties persons sentenced to imprisonment in state institutions.  At the time Judge Lasker denied the applica-
tion because the state commissioner assured the court that the state would voluntarily meet its obligations.
Benjamin v. Malcolm, 88 F.R.D. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). See also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 430.20
(2007) (“When a sentence of imprisonment is pronounced, or when the sentence consists of a fine and the
Court has directed that the defendant be imprisoned until it is satisfied, the defendant must forthwith be
committed to the custody of the appropriate public servant and detained until the sentence is complied
with.”).  Judge Lasker granted this application and ordered the state to move sentenced inmates within
forty-eight hours following conviction.  Subsequent to Judge Lasker’s initial denial, the state prison popu-
lation grew to such an extent that on August 20, 1981, Judge Lasker entered an Order that required the
state to accept, within forty-eight hours of the completion of transfer processing, each person housed at
HDM who is sentenced to a term of imprisonment in a state correctional facility.  Benjamin v. Malcolm,
528 F. Supp. 925, 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).  It is important to note that the conditions at Rikers were not
problems reserved to New York or even to urban city centers but were at least in part problems that state
legislators and city officials across the country faced but were unwilling to deal with.  By the early 1980s,
twenty-nine states were operating either individual institutions or entire prison systems under orders
from federal judges who found conditions so intolerable as to be unconstitutional.  Wendell Rawls Jr.,
Judges’ Authority in Prison Reform Attacked, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1982, at A1.
115. Benjamin v. Malcolm, 564 F. Supp. 668, 674–75, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
116. Id. at 685.
117. Benjamin v. Malcolm, No. 75 Civ. 3073 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 1982).  The Order was entered pursuant to
agreement by both parties that the court would appoint a neutral third-party “compliance consultant” to
assist defendants in achieving compliance with the consent judgments.  The Order did not refer to the body
it created as the “Office of Compliance Consultants,” rather, the parties themselves chose the current title
based on the language in the court’s Order.
118. Storey, supra note 82, at 159.  The first director of the OCC was Kenneth Schoen, a former commissioner
of corrections in Minnesota. Id.  The parties were able to agree to the creation of the OCC in part because
of their respect for Schoen. Id.
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were for the most part, and continue to be, DOC employees, and staff selections
are approved by all parties. This arrangement has allowed staff members to visit
the facilities without being treated as outsiders.  Over the years, the OCC has
been instrumental in assisting the parties to work out many disputes informally
without depending on the court for resolution.121
D. New and Continuing Problems
In the mid-1980s, the crack-cocaine epidemic caused more significant and
distressing problems for the City’s jails.  It led to a rise in arrests and an increase
in violence, both inmate-on-inmate and staff-on-inmate.  In 1986, for example,
in the New York City Correctional Institution for Men (“CIFM”) on Centre
Street, there were over six hundred violent incidents which involved weapons
and infractions for possession of weapons.122  In 1987, Judge Lasker tried the
issue of whether the failure of the DOC to employ reasonable measures to protect
inmates from violence at CIFM violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
against the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishment.”123  The City defendants
presented evidence at the hearing that they had increased the number of cell
searches for weapons, but Judge Lasker found the result to have produced only a
slight decrease in the number of slashings and stabbings.124  Trial testimony de-
tailed the type and frequency of violent behavior.125  The City only began to keep
119. Id.  Admittedly, this salary structure could create a potential conflict of interest for the OCC employees.
However, I am aware of no instance of compromised impartiality on the part of the OCC employees.
They continue to be nothing less than diligent and objective in their efforts.
120. The current director of the OCC is John Doyle III, shareholder of the New York office of Anderson Kill &
Olick, P.C.  Mr. Doyle served as assistant counsel to the Lawyers’ Committee For Civil Rights Under
Law in Jackson, Mississippi in 1965 and 1966, as an Assistant United States Attorney and as assistant
chief of the Criminal Division in the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New
York in 1966–1971, and as chief of the Criminal Division in 1979–1980.  Mr. Doyle received a B.A.
from Fordham University and his J.D. from Harvard Law School.  Resume, John Doyle (on file with
author).  Nicole Austin is the deputy director of the OCC.  Ms. Austin received a B.A. from Queens
College and her M.A. from New York University.  She has experience in vocational rehabilitation, out-
reach, fiscal planning, and administration. Resume, Nicole Austin (on file with author).
121. Storey, supra note 82, at 159.  One example is the process of drafting periodic reports to the court.  Peri-
odically, the OCC circulates its findings among the DOC, LAS and other interested parties for review
and comment.  At times, this process has identified issues which the DOC has addressed without the
court’s intervention.
122. Fisher v. Koehler, 692 F. Supp. 1519, 1527 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).  Judge Lasker described CIFM as “a me-
dium security facility operated by the New York City Department of Correction. It is the principal facility
in which New York City’s sentenced male inmates are incarcerated. The city-sentenced inmates at CIFM
are serving terms of one year or less for violations, misdemeanors, or low-degree felonies.” Id. at 1523.
123. Id. at 1559.
124. Id. at 1527.
125. Id.  For instance, in the month of February 1987, inmate-on-inmate violence resulted in sixteen slash-
ings, lacerations, or stab wounds requiring sutures or emergency room treatment, and thirteen other seri-
ous injuries, including a fractured rib, collapsed lung, a fractured jaw, a neck sprain, and a loss of
consciousness. Id.
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records of violent incidents at CIFM subsequent to the commencement of trial.126
Although the City attempted to downplay the seriousness of organized inmate
violence and extortion, it was apparent that gangs were in control of the jails to a
certain extent.127  The plaintiffs constructed their own records of injury from
anecdotal testimony, clinic logs, and infraction logs.128  The plaintiffs also argued
that there was ample unreported violence because inmates feared reprisals.129
Even more alarming than the inmate-on-inmate violence, plaintiff wit-
nesses also described routine acts of staff-on-inmate violence and instances of the
use of excessive force.130  The evidence at trial established that five major prob-
lem areas at CIFM were significant causes of both inmate-on-inmate and staff-
on-inmate violence: overcrowding; excessive reliance on dormitory housing; lack
of adequate classification; inadequate staffing and supervision; and inadequate
systems for controlling, investigating, and disciplining staff misuse of force.131  In
his opinion, Judge Lasker noted that in response to the litigation, the DOC had
developed and launched a system to classify inmates at CIFM.132  In addition,
Judge Lasker credited defendants for taking steps during trial that would reduce
the use of force in the future.133
126. Id. at 1529.
127. In addition to slashings and beatings, inmates testified to (1) extortion of money in exchange for sleeping
space, called “paying rent,” (2) forcing other inmates to wash clothes or do other menial chores called
“maytagging,” and (3) forcing inmates to pay for telephone use, called “running the phone.”  Many in-
mates referred to the phrase “snitches get stitches” as a slogan used to threaten inmates who complained to
the authorities. Id. at 1527–29.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1532–37.  Judge Lasker concluded that:
The eyewitness testimony heard, bolstered by the voluminous documentary evidence of re-
cord, supports a finding that there is a pattern of excessive force at CIFM, manifesting
itself, inter alia, in the recurrence of (1) use of force out of frustration in response to offen-
sive but non-dangerous inmate goading; (2) officers’ use of excessive force as a means of
obtaining obedience and keeping order; (3) force used as a first resort in reaction to any
inmate behavior that might possibly be interpreted as aggressive; and (4) serious examples
of excessive force by emergency response teams.
Id. at 1538.
131. Id. at 1540.
132. Id. at 1548.  The classification system was launched in May 1987.  The judge noted that “classification
reduces violence because violent inmates are less likely to commit violent acts against others like them-
selves, and because, once violent inmates are identified and grouped, it is possible to take appropriate
control measures such as putting them in single cells and making changes in staffing and programming.”
Id.  Before trial, the DOC admitted that “general population inmates are not classified or separated by
security level, length of sentence, crime of conviction, previous criminal record, or previous history of
incarceration.” Id. at 1547.
133. Id. at 1557.  Judge Lasker explained that:
Commissioner Koehler testified that the Department of Correction has (1) increased the
standards by which correction officers applicants are examined and tested, T. 3387-93; (2)
increased the probationary period for new officers, T. 3395; (3) implemented an early
27
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Notwithstanding the DOC’s efforts, Judge Lasker found that the level of use
of force at CIFM was excessive.  Additionally, he found that the pervasiveness of
staff-on-inmate violence was the predictable result of defendants’ policies and
practices, most significantly the defendants’ failure to prevent misuse of force by
adequately training officers in the appropriate use of force and defendants’ failure
to deter misuse of force by adequately investigating and disciplining use of
force.134  Although Judge Lasker commended the DOC for certain reforms, he
determined there were still conditions at CIFM that required more work.135
In addition, fueled by the crack-cocaine epidemic in the 1980s, the inmate
population at Rikers continued to grow.136  The epidemic led to an increase in
arrests, which in turn, caused the prison population to rise, further exacerbating
overcrowding.137  In November 1989, Judge Lasker approved the implementa-
tion of a new “Use of Force Policy” to address the unconstitutional levels of prison
violence at CIFM.138  The City faced continuing problems with inmate over-
crowding, and in November 1990, Judge Lasker held that the City violated a
court Order that prohibited the housing of inmates in non-housing areas for more
warning system to assist staff experiencing personal or professional problems that can lead
to staff misconduct, T. 3399-3405; (4) taken steps to reduce the amount of overtime work
by staff, DX XXX at ¶ 4(d); and (5) instituted a central monitoring system, whereby all
correctional facilities will maintain a computer file with entries for each officer who has
used force; when any officer uses force on three separate occasions, the warden will inter-
view the officer to ascertain if any problem has developed, T. 3339-3344; Directive 5003.
Id.
134. Id. at 1564.
135. Id. at 1565–66.
Here, the record as it stands now gives no assurance that the changes in policy and proce-
dure at CIFM have significantly reduced violence at CIFM. Moreover, to the extent the
changes have been successful, it can hardly be said that events have “made it absolutely
clear,” as required by Phosphate Export Ass’n., that inmate-inmate violence and staff-
inmate excessive force “could not reasonably be expected to recur.”  It was clear from his
testimony that Commissioner Koehler is attempting in good faith to improve conditions at
CIFM, and the determination that many of these efforts have been spurred in part by this
litigation is not meant as a criticism: certainly this is a case of better late than never.
However, the depressing reality is that while commissioners come and go, problems linger
on, and present and future inmates are entitled to the assurance that these problems will be,
and remain, redressed.  Accordingly, the court is obligated to issue an injunction fitted to the
circumstances.
Id. at 1566 (internal citations omitted).
136. Crystal Nix, Tensions at Rikers: Complex Causes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1986, § 1 at 46.
137. As a result, the City again applied to the court to amend the court Order imposing inmate population
limits.  In April 1989, Judge Lasker concluded not to do so.  Benjamin v. Koehler, 710 F. Supp. 91, 95
(S.D.N.Y. 1989).
138. Fisher v. Koehler, No. 83 Civ. 2128, 1989 WL 135912, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 1989).  In April 1990,
the Second Circuit affirmed Judge Lasker’s earlier finding that prison conditions at CIFM violated the
Eighth Amendment.  Fisher v. Koehler, 902 F.2d 2, 3 (2d Cir. 1990).
28
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\52-1\NLR103.txt unknown Seq: 29 19-NOV-07 15:43
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 52  2007/08
than twenty-four hours.139  Largely because of the City’s noncompliant record,
the court imposed a series of fines for future violations.140  The City urged a
modification to the contempt Order and urged that fine money be diverted to a
bail fund instead of given directly to prisoners as stipulated in the consent decrees,
but that too was rejected by Judge Lasker.141  It is fair to say that without the
constant vigilance of Judge Lasker and his quick response to plaintiffs’ concerns,
much of the violence and discontent at Rikers and the other jails would have only
escalated.
In the early 1990s, the parties began to address the portions of the consent
decrees that governed the provision of food services to detainees.142  Ultimately,
the City agreed to meet the requirements of the decrees by utilizing the “ ‘cook/
chill’ method of food preparation by which food is prepared in advance at a pro-
duction center, chilled, transported, and reheated at the point of service.”143
139. Benjamin v. Sielaff, 752 F. Supp. 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).  Non-housing areas include dayrooms, receiving
rooms, gymnasiums, and program space.  In 1981, the court entered an Order enjoining the Department
from housing inmates in non-housing areas. Id. at 141.  In April 1989, inmates were again required to
spend days of confinement in gymnasiums and unsanitary receiving rooms. Id. As a result, plaintiffs
moved to hold defendants in contempt for violating the 1981 Order. Id. On May 3, 1989, Judge Lasker
issued an additional Order (the “1989 Order”) prohibiting the Department of Correction from confining
inmates in non-housing areas for more than twenty-four hours. Id . The 1989 Order also required
defendants to house “overload inmates” (inmates being transferred from a housing area in one facility to a
housing area in another facility) without delay, setting a guideline of twelve hours. Id. at 142.
140. Id. at 148.  Judge Lasker ordered that for the first twenty-four hours thereafter or any part thereof, each
detainee held in violation of the 1989 Order would be paid $150, and for each additional twelve-hour
period, or any portion thereof, the detainee would be paid an additional $100. Id.
141. Benjamin v. Sielaff, No. 75 Civ. 3073, 1990 WL 212911 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 1990).  Judge Lasker denied
defendants’ motion for several reasons.  Principally, he held that sanctions in the form of payments to a
bail fund rather than to individual inmates had been imposed in cases that involved large-scale deficien-
cies, where there was impact on all inmates in the facility but no specific impact on particular individuals.
However, where the violation of a court Order caused particular injury to individual plaintiffs, Judge
Lasker found that appellate courts generally required that the injured plaintiffs be directly compensated.
Id. at *1.  In addition, Judge Lasker decided against the creation of a bail fund because doing so might
undermine the bail decisions made by state court judges, and because of the administrative difficulties
involved in creating and administering such a fund. Id. at *2.
142. Benjamin v. Malcolm, 156 F.R.D. 561, 563 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
143. Id.  To implement the City’s decision and to expedite compliance with the requirements of the decree, the
court directed the OCC to prepare a Food Service Work Plan, which would identify the tasks required to
bring the defendants into compliance and set schedules for the accomplishment of each task.  In June 1991,
the court adopted the first Food Service Work Plan and entered it as an Order.  After the defendants failed
to carry out the terms of this Work Plan, it was revised to add new dates and steps agreed upon by the
parties, and the court entered a Revised Food Service Work Plan as an Order on July 10, 1992 (The
“1992 Food Service Order”).  The same day, frustrated by the pattern of continued noncompliance, the
court entered its Order: Re Compliance with Work Plan Deadlines (the “1992 Compliance Order”), which
created a schedule of coercive fines for failures to adhere to the requirements of the Work Plan.  The 1992
Food Service Order required the defendants to make a decision by November 1, 1993 as to the means by
which they would provide cook/chill food—either by contracting with a vendor or by building its own
cook/chill production center. Id. By 1993, pursuant to court Order, the City had decided that it would
provide food to inmates by purchasing cook/chill food from a facility located in Orangeburg, New York at
29
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E. The Changing of the Guard
In 1994, Judge Lasker moved to Boston to sit as a senior district court judge
for the District of Massachusetts.  At Judge Lasker’s urging, and with the concur-
rence of the parties, the case was assigned to me.  This happened only months
after my confirmation as a federal district judge, but I immediately undertook the
challenge presented by the consent decrees and the challenge of trying to measure
up to Judge Lasker.  I spent some time with Judge Lasker during the balance of
1994 to familiarize myself with the history and status of the case.  This offered a
window into Judge Lasker’s thinking and allowed me to witness his dedication to
devising viable solutions to the remaining issues raised by the consent decrees.
I issued my first ruling in 1995, shortly after the case was reassigned to me,
as the City sought an extension of time to further evaluate and perhaps devise a
less expensive alternative to the cook/chill method of food service agreed upon
earlier by the parties.144  The City and plaintiffs agreed to an alternative that
would bring the City within substantial compliance with the consent decrees
without converting to the cook/chill plan.145  That same year, there were more
inmate violence problems and I adopted the parties’ agreed upon modification of
the consent decrees to include a ban on the possession or display of jewelry indica-
tive of gang affiliation.146
The problem of inmate overcrowding continued to plague the New York
City jails, and in February 1996, pursuant to an Order issued by Judge Lasker
in 1990, I directed the payment of fines to two prisoners who were held in a non-
housing area for more than twenty-four hours.147  Inmate overcrowding and
prison violence seemed to go hand-in-hand, and in April 1996, I temporarily
modified the consent decrees to allow a limitation on access to the Central Puni-
tive Segregation Unit (“CPSU”) law library because violence had grown in and
the Rockland Psychiatric Center (the “Rockland County facility”).  A year later, the City moved for an
Order modifying its obligation to use the Rockland County facility.
144. Benjamin v. Malcolm, 884 F. Supp. 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).  The system in place at that time was “cook/
serve,” where the food for each facility was cooked on the premises of the facility. Id. at 123.  The goal of
the “cook/chill” method was to avoid serving food below health code required temperatures.  Citing finan-
cial hardship, the City sought a ninety-day extension of time to institute the “cook/chill” method.  Id. at
123–24.  The City cited the greatly increased cost of the cook/chill system, estimated at between $348 and
$378 million, as well as the City’s “worsening” financial condition. Id. at 124.  I did not differ much with
the plaintiffs’ assertion that the City was attempting to “wiggle” out of its obligations under the consent
decree, but I nonetheless granted an extension of fifty-six days for the City to develop a cheaper alterna-
tive. Id.
145. Benjamin v. Jacobson, No. 75 Civ. 3073, 1995 WL 681297 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 1995).  It was a complex
plan to update existing kitchens and ensure among other things, that food be stored and served at appro-
priate temperatures.
146. Benjamin v. Malcolm, No. 75 Civ. 3073, 1995 WL 378529 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 1995).
147. Benjamin v. Jacobson, No. 75 Civ. 3073, 1996 WL 51194 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 1996).
30
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\52-1\NLR103.txt unknown Seq: 31 19-NOV-07 15:43
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 52  2007/08
en route to the library.148  The Corrections Department had hoped simply to
deliver legal books to violent inmates (the CPSU is reserved for the most violent
inmates), with the belief that library assaults would thereby be reduced, but I
rejected this proposal.149
F. The Prison Litigation Reform Act
In 1996, Congress passed and President Clinton signed the Prison Litiga-
tion Reform Act (“PLRA”) as part of an appropriations bill.150  Its purpose was
two-fold.  First, the PLRA’s early Congressional sponsors touted it as a vehicle by
which the explosion of what they concluded was frivolous prison litigation would
be curtailed.151  For instance, Senator Robert Dole cited an analysis by the Na-
tional Association of Attorneys General, which estimated that the states spend
over $80 million each year on frivolous inmate litigation.152  Second, the PLRA
was enacted in response to the urging of state officials who saw the judiciary as
taking control of the prison system they believed would and should be monitored
only by the legislature.153
148. Benjamin v. Jacobson, 923 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).  The CPSU was moved to OBCC on March
9–10, 1996. Id. at 518.
149. Editorial, Court Control of the City Jails, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1996, at A16; see Ross Sandler, The
City Seeks to Regain Control Over its Jails, and Receives Help from the Federal Court and Con-
gress , 2 CITY LAW 49, 53 (June/July 1996) (detailing examples of violence, such as in a five week period
there were eleven infractions, several of which had been brutal slashings and beatings which resulted in
hospital treatment for both inmates and prison guards).
150. 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (1996).  When it was finally signed into law, the PLRA was included as Title VIII of
the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act,
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996).  The House of Representatives first introduced the
PLRA as H.R. 667, the Violent Criminal Incarceration Act of 1995. H.R. REP. NO. 104-21 (1995).
Title II of H.R. 667 was called “Stopping Abusive Prisoner Lawsuits” and its purpose was to curtail
frivolous inmate litigation.  H.R. 667, 104th Cong. (1995).  Title III of H.R. 667 was called “Stop Turn-
ing Out Prisoners” and its purpose was to limit prospective relief for prisoners. Id.  H.R. 667 did not
survive for long at the time because in December 1995, President Clinton vetoed the omnibus appropria-
tions bill to which H.R. 667 was attached.  142 CONG. REC. 8238 (1996) (statement of Sen. Abraham).
151. Some of the frivolous lawsuits mentioned by the Senators who sponsored the bill include: (1) an inmate
who claimed $1 million in damages for civil rights violations because his ice cream had melted; (2) an
inmate alleged that being forced to listen to his unit manager’s country and western music constituted cruel
and unusual punishment; (3) an inmate sued because he was served chunky instead of smooth peanut
butter; (4) two prisoners sued to force taxpayers to pay for sex change surgery while they were in prison.
142 CONG. REC. S3703 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1996) (statement of Sen. Abraham).  It is doubtful that the
above examples are representative of the majority of inmate lawsuits.  From my experience with Benja-
min, it is clear that even pre-trial detainees can and are subject to violence and excessive force, among
other constitutional wrongs.  However, the degree to which inmate claims lack merit is less clear.  That
over 94 percent of inmates that file lawsuits do not realize any relief is troubling but is not conclusive
evidence that a majority of inmate claims are meritless.  Editorial, Criminal Oversight, WALL ST. J.,
June 10, 1996, at A18.
152. 141 CONG. REC. 27,042 (1995) (statement of Sen. Dole).
153. On September 19, 1995, representatives from the National Association of Attorneys General wrote a letter
to the Majority leader, Senator Bob Dole, to express the association’s strong support for the PLRA. Id. at
26,553. See also 142 CONG. REC. 8236 (1996) (statement of Sen. Abraham) (stating that prisoner
31
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The legislative history of the PLRA is sparse, in large part because the
PLRA was not the subject of significant debate.154  Nevertheless, the record is
clear with respect to the criticism that federal courts had overstepped their au-
thority and were mollycoddling prisoners in state and local jails.155  Put another
way, the sentiment was that the time had come to require the municipal and
state legislatures to take responsibility for their own correctional facilities.156  Af-
ter all, the PLRA sponsors opined, the cost of providing proper conditions in
prisons is a state and municipal obligation and thus should be borne by state and
municipal legislative bodies, which unlike the judiciary, are accountable to their
constituents.157  Again, the alleged problem at which the legislation took aim was
the proposition—echoed throughout much of the testimony before the Senate Ju-
diciary Committee hearing—that prisons have become too comfortable due to the
intercessions of federal judges.158
The PLRA narrowed the previously available remedies utilized by federal
courts to correct unlawful prison conditions, and this narrowing was precisely the
aspect of the PLRA that changed the contours of the consent decrees in Benjamin.
Three sections of the PLRA were and continue to be relevant to the Benjamin
consent decrees: Section 3626(a)(1)(A) (the “prospective relief” provisions), Section
3626(b) (the “termination” provision), and Section 3626(E)(2)(A)(I) (the “auto-
matic stay” provision).
Under the prospective relief provision, federal courts are not permitted to
“grant or approve any prospective relief unless and until the court finds that such
lawsuits have resulted in “turning over the running of our [state’s] prisons to the [federal] courts”); 141
CONG. REC. 27,042 (1995) (statement of Sen. Dole) (detailing how the guidelines set by the PLRA will
“restrain liberal Federal judges who see violations of constitutional rights in every prisoner complaint . . .
[and use them] to micromanage State and local prison systems.”); Id. at 27,045 (1995) (statement of Sen.
Kyl) (noting that the PLRA will assure that the states “regain control of the Federal court system, and we
do not just allow the Federal judges to dictate to the States how their prison systems will be run”).
154. See  142 CONG. REC. 8236 (1996) (statement of Sen. Abraham); 142 CONG. REC. 5193 (1996) (statement
of Sen. Kennedy); 141 CONG. REC. 35,623 (1995) (statement of Rep. LoBiondo); 141 CONG. REC. 27,041
(1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch); 141 CONG. REC. 26,548 (1995) (statement of Sen. Dole); 141 CONG.
REC. 26,448 (1995) (statement of Sen. Abraham); Overhauling the Nation’s Prisons: Hearing on S.
400 Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of Steve J. Martin); 141
CONG. REC. 14,570 (1995) (statement of Sen. Dole); H.R. REP. NO. 104-21 (1995).
155. Benjamin v. Jacobson, 935 F. Supp. 332, 340–41 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). See also Overhauling the Nation’s
Prisons: Hearing on S. 400 Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995) (statement
of Steve J. Martin).
156. Overhauling the Nation’s Prisons: Hearing on S. 400 Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary,
104th Cong. (1995) (statement of Steve J. Martin).
157. See , e.g., Inclusion of Provisions of the Canady-Geren Bill: Hearing on H. 3019 Before the H.
Judiciary Comm., Subcomm. on Crime, 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of Lynne Abraham, Philadel-
phia District Atty.) (stating that federal court micro-management of the state’s prisons “has intruded itself
unnecessarily into the state criminal justice systems and completely undermined their integrity and their
ability to dispense justice”).
158. Martin, supra note 154.
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relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the viola-
tion of the federal right [of a plaintiff or class of plaintiffs], and is the least
intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the federal right.”159  This
aspect of the prospective relief provision is often referred to as the “need-narrow-
ness-intrusiveness” test.160  Moreover, in order to construct the appropriate rem-
edy, courts must “give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety
or the operation of [the] criminal justice system.”161
Under the termination provision, a defendant or intervener is entitled to
“immediate termination of prospective relief” in cases where a court originally
granted prospective relief without making the findings that are now mandatory
under Section 3626(a).162  Prospective relief may continue, however, if the court
“makes written findings based on the record that the prospective relief remains
necessary to correct a current or ongoing violation of the federal right, extends no
further than necessary to correct the violation of the federal right, and that the
prospective relief is narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means to correct the
violation.”163  Finally, the automatic stay provision requires a court—beginning
thirty days from the filing of a motion to terminate all prospective relief—to stay
such prospective relief pending the court’s decision on the underlying motion.164
Not surprisingly, the City moved for immediate termination of the consent
decrees and all supplemental orders.165  Each side submitted extensive declara-
tions along with thousands of pages of exhibits.166  The exhibits essentially pro-
vided a historical survey of the consent decrees.167  The City took the position that
the consent decrees have added to what they characterized as micro-management
of the jails.168  Michael F. Jacobson, then commissioner of the Department of
Correction, suggested that the City of New York was in some sense coerced into
signing the consent decrees and what he described disparagingly as “court or-
dered” stipulations.169
In July 1996, I held that the termination provision of the PLRA was consti-
tutional and vacated the consent decrees pursuant to the termination provi-
159. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (2000). See  18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(7) (defining prospective relief as “all relief
other than compensatory monetary damages”).
160. See , e.g., Benjamin v. Jacobson, 172 F.3d 144, 150 (2d Cir. 1999).
161. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (2000).
162. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2) (2000).
163. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(3) (2000).
164. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(2)(A)(I) (2000).
165. Benjamin v. Jacobson, 935 F. Supp. 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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sion.170  I was not alone in so holding; at that time, five other courts had upheld
the constitutionality of the termination provision.171  Only one court struck down
the termination provision as violative of the separation of powers.172  I main-
tained my supervisory role pending defendants’ appeal to the Second Circuit rul-
ing on my vacatur of the consent decrees.173
The Second Circuit determined the fate of the consent decrees in a panel
decision in 1997174 and in an en banc decision in 1999.175  In its 1999 en banc
decision, the Second Circuit reconsidered and vacated its prior panel decision.176
The Second Circuit agreed with me that the termination provision of the PLRA
is constitutional, but “only if it is interpreted as simply constricting the jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts to enforce the consent decrees, rather than as annulling
those decrees.”177  The Second Circuit thus held that:
The Act provides for the termination, though not the annulment, of
consent decrees that do not meet the need-narrowness-intrusiveness
criteria established by the Act; that plaintiffs’ constitutional challenges
to the termination provision were properly rejected; and that plaintiffs
were entitled to an opportunity to show, in accordance with the Act,
that any or all of the prospective relief ordered by the Decrees should be
continued.178
170. Benjamin v. Jacobson, 935 F. Supp. 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
171. See  Gavin v. Branstad, 122 F.3d 1081, 1083 (8th Cir. 1997); Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 365, 368 (4th
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 138 L.Ed. 2d 217 (1997); Jame v. Lash, 965 F. Supp. 1190, 1192 (N.D. Ind.
1997); Jensen v. County of Lake, 958 F. Supp. 397, 400 (N.D. Ind. 1997); Inmates of the Suffolk County
Jail v. Sheriff of Suffolk County, 952 F. Supp. 869, 883 (D. Mass. 1997).
172. Hadix v. Johnson, 947 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
173. See Benjamin v. Jacobson, No. 75 Civ. 3073, 1997 WL 5910 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 1997). Fire safety at the
prisons was an ongoing problem and in April 1997, I ordered the City to provide the OCC with the
details of their fire safety plan for Rikers Island and other scheduled maintenance.  Benjamin v. Jacobson,
No. 75 Civ. 3073. 1997 WL 187351, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 1997).  By November 1998, I ordered the
City to adhere to proposed improvement schedules, to apprise plaintiffs and the OCC of their progress and
any potential delays, and to submit to the court an internal procedure proposal for response to fire safety
reports.  Benjamin v. Kerik, No. 75 Civ. 3073, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18036 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 1998).
174. Benjamin v. Jacobson, 124 F.3d 162, 162 (2d Cir. 1997).  The panel reasoned that even absent findings of
need-narrowness-intrusiveness the PLRA did not require the termination of consent decrees but merely
prohibited their enforcement in federal court, with the parties free to enforce them in state court. Id.
175. Benjamin v. Jacobson, 172 F.3d 144, 154 (2d Cir. 1999).  The Court of Appeals thus stated:
It follows that the Consent Decrees remain binding on the parties, although the jurisdiction
available to them to enforce these binding agreements has been changed.  And the parties
are no more free to ignore the agreements they have made than they are to ignore any other
agreement as to which no redress in federal courts is available.
Id. at 178.
176. Id. at 154.
177. Benjamin v. Jacobson, 124 F.3d at 164.
178. Benjamin v. Jacobson, 172 F.3d at 154.
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The PLRA would only “immediately” terminate consent decree provisions that
were “granted in the absence of the specified need-narrowness-intrusiveness
findings.”179
Pursuant to the circuit’s decision, I held hearings to make findings with
respect to some of the provisions of the consent decree.180  I determined that sev-
eral facets of the consent decree could not pass constitutional muster under the
PLRA.181  However, I held that prospective relief was available with respect to
many of the provisions, and added a requirement for a due process hearing for
inmates placed on restraint status and Red I.D. status, as well as the delays in
inmates’ meetings with counsel.182  The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that
where pre-trial detainees challenged prison regulations that compromised the
Sixth Amendment’s safeguard of the right to counsel because the regulations hin-
dered attorney visitation, pre-trial detainees were not required to show actual
injury.  The Second Circuit found that there was a continuing need for prospec-
tive relief regarding detainees’ right to counsel, the relief granted complied with
the PLRA, and pre-trial detainees subject to additional restraints during move-
ment within or outside the jail were entitled to reasonable procedural
protections.183
179. The Second Circuit accordingly remanded the case and instructed me to allow the plaintiffs to show that
any or all of the prospective relief should be continued. Id. at 158, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 824, 120 S.Ct.
72, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 5098 (1999).
180. On February 7, 8, 9, 14, and 15, 2000, I held hearings that examined, among other things, the conditions
affecting attorney visitation in the defendants’ prisons and the due process afforded to Red I.D. and
Restraint status detainees.  Benjamin v. Kerik, 102 F. Supp. 2d 157, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
181. I struck down the law library portions of the consent decrees because I did not find any injury regarding
alleged inadequacies in the law library facilities; the provisions of the decrees relating to involuntary
placement in the DOC’s maximum security, protective custody, and homosexual housing units because
there was no evidence that inmates placed in these units were deprived of a liberty interest; and the mail
handling portions of the consent decrees because there was no evidence that mail handling practices vio-
lated inmates’ due process rights.  Id.  Pursuant to the PLRA, the District Court, by Order dated Decem-
ber 15, 2000, terminated three additional Orders related to the consent decrees.  These include: the
Consent Order Re: Contact Visits at NYCCIFW in Forts v. Malcolm (July 29, 1978); the Order Re:
Overcrowding in Consolidated Cases v. Malcolm (June 23, 1981); and the Stipulation for Order Re:
Medical/Health Services in Consolidated Cases v. Malcolm (July 10, 1991).  Benjamin v. Fraser, 161 F.
Supp. 2d 151, 154 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).  
182. I held that prospective relief was available to Red I.D. and restraint status inmates because I found that
these physical restraints were a severe deprivation of liberty, and therefore that the DOC should have
afforded disciplinary due process hearings to such inmates in accordance with the Supreme Court’s decision
in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (holding that a prisoner was entitled under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to notice and some kind of a hearing in connection with
discipline determinations involving serious misconduct).  Benjamin v. Kerik, 102 F. Supp. at 175.  I also
determined that relief was available to rectify the delays in attorney visitation because (1) administrative
obstacles to attorney-client visitation in the facilities burdened detainees’ right to counsel and right of
access to courts and (2) these obstacles were not justifiable restrictions on the right of detainees’ access to
courts. Id. at 178.
183. Benjamin v. Fraser, 264 F.3d 175, 190–91, 191 n.13 (2d Cir. 2001).
35
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\52-1\NLR103.txt unknown Seq: 36 19-NOV-07 15:43
A NECESSARY AND PROPER ROLE FOR FEDERAL COURTS IN PRISON REFORM
G. Where We’ve Come From And Where We Are Today
The areas of prospective relief that I have upheld under the PLRA include:
(1) environmental health (including sanitary conditions, ventilation, lighting,
and extreme temperatures), (2) attorney visitation and confidentiality, (3) due
process in the context of pre-trial detainees who are placed in Red I.D. and re-
straint status, (4) fire safety, and (5) modular housing units.  In this section, I
reflect upon the improvements in each area and identify remaining open items.
1. Environmental Health
In May 2000,184 I held hearings on environmental health conditions and
determined that: (1) there was a continuing and ongoing violation of the basic
right to adequate ventilation in ARDC, GMDC, GRVC, JATC, MDC, NIC,
OBCC, RMSC, and the mental observations units at AMKC;185 (2) sanitation
in non-medical areas, and sanitation in the RMSC clinic and the GMDC infir-
mary failed to meet basic constitutional standards;186 and (3) lighting was consti-
tutionally inadequate in the medical areas at the GMDC infirmary and the
RMSC clinic and in the non-medical areas at all of the defendants’ jails, with the
exceptions of ARDC and AMKC.187  I found significant improvements and no
constitutional violation in some areas (e.g., plumbing, vermin control, food ser-
vice, personal hygiene, and laundry).188
184. Benjamin v. Fraser, 161 F. Supp. 2d 151, 154 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).  The fourteen jails under review in the
May proceeding were the Anna M. Kross Center (“AMKC”), the Adolescent Reception and Detention
Center (“ARDC”), the George Motchan Detention Center (“GMDC”), the James A. Thomas Center
(“JATC”), the Rose M. Singer Center (“RMSC”), the George R. Vierno Center (“GRVC”), the North
Infirmary Command (“NIC”), and the West Facility (“West”) on Rikers Island; the Vernon C. Bain Center
(“VCBC”), a “maritime facility” anchored off the Bronx; the Manhattan Detention Center (“MDC”), the
Queens Detention Center (“QHD”), the Brooklyn Detention Center (“BKHD”), and the Bronx Detention
Center (“BXHD”).  Hereinafter, I refer to these jails by their acronym equivalents.
185. Benjamin v. Fraser, 161 F. Supp. 2d at 189.  As the court explained in its subsequent opinion of March
2001, the court in its January 2001 decision had inadvertently included QHD among the facilities that
required remedy to improve ventilation.  Benjamin v. Fraser, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3173, at *20
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2001).  In addition, the court determined that ventilation in the intake areas of QHD
was constitutionally inadequate. Id.
186. Benjamin v. Fraser, 161 F. Supp. 2d at 189.
187. Id. at 185–86.
188. Id. at 189.  I directed the parties to submit recommendations for prospective relief governing ventilation,
sanitation, and lighting within thirty days from the date of my Order.  Instead, by March 2001, both
parties moved for reconsideration and clarification of the January 2001 Order.  Benjamin v. Fraser, No.
75 Civ. 3073, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3173, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2001).  Pursuant to these motions,
I held that BKHD and QHD were constitutionally deficient with respect to intake ventilation, but that
minimal constitutional standards appeared to be met with respect to intake ventilation at VCBC and West
Facility.  In addition, I held that as of the May 2000 hearings the sanitary conditions at NIC’s medical
areas (inclusive of NIC’s clinics areas and infirmary housing areas) constituted a current and ongoing
constitutional violation.  I further required that the OCC monitor the temperature at AMKC, ARDC,
BKHD, GMDC, GRVC, JATC, NIC, QHD, OBCC, and RMSC.
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Between 2001 and 2002, the City moved to stay certain Orders related to
environmental conditions and other previous issues.189  For example, in March
2002, the City moved the Second Circuit for a stay of limited aspects of my Or-
ders.190 By Order dated April 23, 2002, the Second Circuit granted a stay of
three provisions of my prior Orders providing for a six-foot separation between
inmate beds, completion of remaining shower renovations, and replacement of
lighting fixtures.191
Thereafter, and on a more serious issue, the Second Circuit, in response to
defendants’ appeals of my 2001 Orders, agreed with my conclusions that the
OCC was not a special master under the PLRA, and that the PLRA governed
special masters, but only subsequent to the Act’s enactment.192
a. Sanitation
Sanitary conditions are a recurring problem in the City’s jails.  My 2001
Environmental Order set detailed schedules for cleaning the prisons.193  While
these Orders smack of the kind of micro-managing I neither enjoy nor advocate,
the saddest part is that the OCC and LAS painted a picture of such distressful
conditions that I had no choice.
The DOC’s compliance with the provisions of my 2001 Environmental Or-
der regarding sanitary conditions has been mixed.  During 2002 and early 2003,
the DOC seemed to be improving the sanitary conditions in the jails.194  Between
189. In July 2001, I held that the OCC as an entity properly fell within the statutory requirements of the
PLRA:  specifically, that (1) the OCC was not a special master and, regardless, it would still not be subject
to the PLRA because Section 3626(f) only applies to court agents appointed post-PLRA enactment, (2) the
OCC was not a form of prospective relief, and that even if it was, it was necessary, narrowly drawn, and
as unobtrusive as possible.  Benjamin v. Fraser, 156 F. Supp. 2d 333, 341–47 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
190. Benjamin v. Fraser, 343 F.3d 35, 43 (2d Cir. 2003).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 43–50.
193. For example, in my April 26, 2001 Environmental Order, I charged the defendants with the following
tasks with respect to AMKC (except for the medical areas), ARDC, GMDC, RMSC, JATC, GRVC, NIC,
OBCC, MDC, BKHD, QHD, West, VCBC, and BXHD: (1) to clean and sanitize various personal
hygiene and sanitation areas at least once per day and power wash the showers with a bleach solution once
per quarter; (2) to complete shower replacement by August 1, 2002; (3) to clean and sanitize living areas
once per week; (4) to clean cells upon vacancy; (5) to clean and sanitize mattresses between uses by differ-
ent detainees; (6) to provide ample cleaning supplies and instruments that are stored in clean and venti-
lated areas; and (7) to provide detainees with food storage containers. Benjamin v. Fraser, 156 F. Supp.
2d at 345.
194. This may be surmised by the fact that complaints about sanitation were for the most part dropping during
each consecutive monitoring period in 2002.  From January through March 2002, the OCC received
twenty-three complaints relating to different aspects of sanitation. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE CONSUL-
TANTS, REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS 5 (Jan. 1, 2002–Mar. 31, 2002).  During the period
from April through July 2002, OCC received twenty-seven sanitation complaints. OFFICE OF COMPLI-
ANCE CONSULTANTS, REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS 5 (Apr. 1, 2002–July 31, 2002).  From
August through December 2002, OCC received nine sanitation complaints. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE
CONSULTANTS, REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS 5 (Aug. 1, 2002–Dec. 31, 2002).  From Jan-
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2003 and 2004, the OCC began to monitor the condition of the showers in accor-
dance with the findings of its sanitation expert.195  The DOC implemented a
number of measures to address the issues highlighted by the expert’s report—for
example, the use of “Clean Teams” consisting of a number of inmates supervised
by trained DOC staff to clean the shower and bathrooms in each area once a
month. The OCC inspected a sampling of the bathroom and shower areas, and
found much improvement compared to earlier conditions.196  There was a signifi-
cant decrease in the number of complaints about sanitary conditions.197  The
OCC found that for the most part the DOC was delivering adequate cleaning
supplies.198  In mid-2004, OCC’s expert found that the DOC had made “signifi-
uary through April 2003, OCC received eight complaints on sanitary conditions. OFFICE OF COMPLI-
ANCE CONSULTANTS, REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS 5 (Jan. 1, 2003–Apr. 30, 2003).
195. From the period beginning January through April 2003, OCC began monitoring the conditions of the
showers in accordance with the findings of the expert. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE CONSULTANTS, REPORT
ON ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS 7 (Jan. 1, 2003–Apr. 30, 2003).  In September 2002, the expert in-
spected the sanitary conditions at GMDC and RMSC. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE CONSULTANTS, RE-
PORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS 5 (Aug. 1, 2002–Dec. 31, 2002).  From May through August
2003, OCC received sixteen complaints regarding sanitation, primarily concerning the bathroom and
shower areas. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE CONSULTANTS, REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS 5
(May 1, 2003–Aug. 31, 2003).  In its May through August 2003 report, OCC continued to find improve-
ment in the sanitation conditions throughout the housing areas in each jail. Id.  From September through
December 2003, OCC received fifteen complaints regarding sanitation. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE CON-
SULTANTS, REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS 4 (Sept. 1, 2003–Dec. 31, 2003).  During this
period, however, OCC itself began monitoring sanitation conditions in all areas, for which it found 315
violations.
196. See  all sources cited supra note 195.
197. The number of complaints OCC received continued to drop.  From January through April 2004, OCC
received twelve complaints regarding sanitation, and observed 294 violations. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE
CONSULTANTS, REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS 4 (Jan. 1, 2004–Apr. 30, 2004).  From May
through August 2004, OCC received six complaints regarding sanitation, and observed 295 violations.
OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE CONSULTANTS, REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS 5 (May 1,
2004–Aug. 31, 2004).  In addition, during the May through August 2004 monitoring period, OCC in-
spected the sanitation conditions in the living areas of RMSC and in the bathroom and shower areas of
the modular housing units at RMSC. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE CONSULTANTS, REPORT ON OCC-
MONITORED CONDITIONS 2, 5 (May 1, 2004–Aug. 31, 2004).  OCC observed that the majority of cells
were clean and found only minimal violations in the modulars. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE CONSULTANTS,
REPORT ON OCC-MONITORED CONDITIONS 5 (May 1, 2004–Aug. 31, 2004).  From September through
December 2004, the OCC received ten complaints regarding sanitation and observed 614 violations.
OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE CONSULTANTS, REPORT ON OCC-MONITORED CONDITIONS 4 (May 1,
2004–Aug. 31, 2004).  OCC conducted inspections of sanitation conditions at AMKC and GRVC and
found marked improvements. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE CONSULTANTS, REPORT ON OCC-MONITORED
CONDITIONS 5 (Sept. 1, 2004–Dec. 31, 2004).
198. During the first third of 2004, OCC examined whether DOC provided the housing areas with sufficient
amounts of cleaning supplies to maintain adequate sanitary conditions. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE CON-
SULTANTS, REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS 8 (May 1, 2004–Aug. 31, 2004).  In addition, the
OCC found that of all the jails, the sanitary conditions in the bathrooms and showers in ARDC were by
far the worse. Id.
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cant progress” in the sanitary conditions at certain facilities.199  LAS’s expert
sanitarian also found the clinic sanitation to have greatly improved.200  Between
2005 and 2006, compliance and improvements were mixed.201  While major vio-
lations202 have been infrequent, the City continues to struggle, albeit for the most
part successfully, to fully comply with the Environmental Orders pursuant to the
consent decrees.
b. Ventilation
Ventilation problems in the City’s jails have persisted for decades.203  Proper
ventilation requires an adequate supply of fresh air coming in and an adequate
exhaust of impure air.204  Proper “ventilation may be achieved either through
active or passive means.”205  Among other things, my various Environmental
Orders concerning ventilation have required defendants to inspect, test, and re-
pair or replace all ventilation systems and to certify that these tasks were com-
pleted.206  For the period January through April 2004, the OCC compiled its
199. On May 26 and 27, 2004, the OCC’s expert inspected the clinics at NIC, RMSC, and GMDC. OFFICE
OF COMPLIANCE CONSULTANTS, REPORT ON OCC-MONITORED CONDITIONS 7 (May 1, 2004–Aug. 31,
2004).
200. Legal Aid’s expert joined the OCC’s expert during the second day of his inspection on May 27, 2004. Id.
201. During the first third of 2006, the OCC reported marked improvements in sanitation as compared with
the previous monitoring period in 2005. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE CONSULTANTS, REPORT ON ENVI-
RONMENTAL CONDITIONS 6 (Jan. 1, 2006–Apr. 30, 2006).  Also during this period, the OCC’s expert
sanitarian, Mr. Pepper, inspected a sample of the jails and noted improvement in the areas of cleaning
and sanitizing. Id. During the latter two-thirds of 2006, the OCC observed an increase in sanitation
violations and a decline from the previous monitoring period with respect to the sanitary conditions in
bathrooms and showers.
202. For example, one “major violation” reported by the expert sanitarian was the improper storage and clean-
ing of the cleaning equipment itself.  OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE CONSULTANTS, REPORT ON OCC-MONI-
TORED CONDITIONS 7 (May 1, 2004–Aug. 31, 2004).
203. Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).  For example, as far back as 1974, the court
noted that “inadequacy of ventilation [at MHD] . . . unnecessarily burden[s] the health of its prisoners.”
Id.
204. Benjamin v. Fraser, 161 F. Supp. 2d 151, 160 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
205. Id.  (“Active ventilation is commonly used in sealed buildings with few apertures, and involves the use of
mechanical air delivery and exhaust systems.  Passive ventilation relies on the exchange of air
through open windows.”).
206. Benjamin v. Fraser, No. 75 Civ. 3073 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2001) (“Order on environmental conditions”).
DOC was also required to (1) establish a system to balance the mechanical ventilation systems annually;
(2) complete mechanical repairs to roof fans at ARDC and inventory other required ventilation repairs;
(3) provide a repair schedule such that all ventilation repairs are completed before August 1, 2002; (4)
ensure that all bathroom and shower areas have functional mechanical ventilation at all times; (5) ensure
that all windows designed to be opened were operational; (6) with the exception of mental health areas,
not house detainees in cells without operational windows; (7) provide OCC and the court with informa-
tion regarding non-functioning or malfunctioning mechanical ventilation in intake areas; and (8) ensure
that ventilation registers in cells and dorms in intake areas are cleaned weekly. Id.  In November 2003, I
issued another Order to further the City’s efforts to remedy the constitutionally deficient ventilation sys-
tems.  Benjamin v. Horn, No. 75 Civ. 3073 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2003) (“Order regarding testing and
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own findings on ventilation and compared them to the inspections performed by
the Public Health Sanitarian.207  In certain jails or housing areas the OCC
found a greater number of violations and in others the Public Health Sanitarian
found more violations.208  The OCC concluded that because of the discrepancy, it
would procure a ventilation expert to review the findings of the Public Health
Sanitarian.209
Ventilation has been a particularly challenging area because it has involved
numerous expert investigations with competing findings (and interests for that
matter) as well as possibly unrealistic goals.210  Despite these mixed findings, the
ventilation problem has seen improvements. For example, during the last moni-
toring period of 2006, the OCC found that in the housing areas surveyed, 93
percent of the windows were operable.211  Further, the City, as of September 15,
2007, has provided a sweeping ventilation plan which at last promises to im-
prove the air quality and circulation throughout the jails.
c. Lighting
Further, in my 2001 Environmental Order, I found that few facilities pro-
vided adequate foot-candles of light and that in most facilities the lighting was
repair of ventilation systems”).  This Order was issued after the Second Circuit’s decision of September
2003, in which it affirmed my January and March 2001 determinations that ventilation was constitu-
tionally deficient in ARDC, GMDC, GRVC, JATC, MDC, NIC, OBCC, RMSC, BKHD, QHD, and
the mental observation units at AMKC.  Benjamin v. Fraser, 343 F.3d 35, 57 (2d Cir. 2003).  The
Second Circuit remanded the ventilation balancing issue to this court for resolution, and the November 14,
2003 Order merely memorialized the agreement reached by the parties on how to address ventilation in
the facilities. Id.
207. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE CONSULTANTS, REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS 6 (Jan. 1,
2004–Apr. 30, 2004).
208. Id.  Despite my Order, during the May through August 2004 monitoring period, the OCC inspected the
vents in BBKC and found 257 to be poorly maintained. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE CONSULTANTS, RE-
PORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS 8 (May 1, 2004–Aug. 31, 2004).
209. Id. at 13.  The OCC procured ventilation expert Lawless & Magione in 2005.  In July 2005, the ventila-
tion expert submitted its report on conditions at OBCC, GRVC, RMSC, and NIC.  On January 17, 2006,
the parties met with the ventilation expert to discuss its findings in further detail. OFFICE OF COMPLI-
ANCE CONSULTANTS, REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS, supra note 208, at 13.
210. In 2005, the OCC procured a ventilation expert to study ventilation at four of the jails. Beginning in
January 2006, the OCC set out to monitor the operability of windows in facilities governed by the venti-
lation portion of the April 26, 2001 Environmental Order. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE CONSULTANTS,
REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS 9 (Sept. 1, 2005–Dec. 31, 2005).  The ventilation expert,
Lawless & Mangione, studied the ventilation at OBCC, GRVC, RMSC, and NIC, and submitted its
report in July of 2005.  Unfortunately, the OCC determined that the expert’s recommendations were not
practical, and by early 2006 the parties met again with the expert in order to obtain recommendations on
how to implement more immediate and realistic remedies.  Id. 
211. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE CONSULTANTS, REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS 52 (Sept. 1,
2006–Dec. 31, 2006).  The OCC surveyed fifty-nine housing areas in GMDC and inspected 2062 win-
dows. Id.
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constitutionally inadequate.212  In general, the best recorded light outputs mea-
sured approximately twelve to thirteen foot-candles of light and the worst mea-
sured approximately two to three foot-candles of light.
On April 7, 2006,213 after hearing from plaintiffs and defendants (as I al-
ways do), I ordered the defendants to, among other things, provide no less than
twenty foot-candles of light at bed or desk level for each inmate, and in areas
where this would be unduly burdensome, to provide no less than fifteen foot-
candles of light.214  I also directed the OCC to monitor the defendants’ compliance
with the Order, and included a provision that terminates the Order if, after one
year of monitoring, the OCC reports that defendants are in substantial compli-
ance, and plaintiffs do not apply within forty-five days of the OCC’s report to
extend the monitoring.215
Thereafter, the DOC undertook a light bulb replacement project.216  Some
facilities have already been completed.217  In July 2006, the OCC staff received
the requisite equipment with which to monitor lighting and the staff were
trained on its use by the DOC.218  On September 10, 2007, the OCC reported
approximately 80 percent compliance with the twenty foot-candle requirement
212. Benjamin v. Fraser, 161 F. Supp. 2d 151, 182 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“While this Court will not decide here
which standard is appropriate, it is clear that all but a few Department facilities are dimly lit and thus
provide constitutionally inadequate lighting.”).
213. Pursuant to the Second Circuit’s September 2003 decision in Benjamin v. Fraser, 343 F.3d 35 (2d Cir.
2003).
214. Benjamin v. Fraser, No. 75 Civ. 3073 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2006) (“April 7 Lighting Order”).  I ordered the
defendants to accomplish the transition to adequate lighting by no later than May 1, 2006, except where
capital renovations or replacement of light fixtures were required.  I also ordered the defendants to (1)
notify the OCC and plaintiffs’ counsel of the areas in which fifteen foot-candles of light will be provided;
(2) notify the OCC and plaintiffs’ counsel as to the reasons, if any, which prevent the defendants from
complying with the May 1, 2006 deadline; (3) replace all fluorescent bulbs after 8,000 hours of use; (4)
replace ballasts as needed; (5) conform policy directives so that they are consistent with the requirements of
my Order; (6) not house detainees in cells with lights that do not work properly; (7) provide at least one
table with twenty foot-candles of light in case defendants are unable to provide fifteen foot-candles of light
in the dormitories; (8) properly clean or replace obscured light shields and bulbs/fixtures in the dormitories;
and (9) provide no less that thirty foot-candles of general lighting and one hundred foot-candles of task
lighting in the medical areas at GMDC, NIC, and RMSC where patients are examined and medication is
handled. Id.
215. Id.  The April 7 Lighting Order replaced paragraph 17 of the April 26, 2001 Environmental Order.  The
termination provision does not terminate the provision of light in medical areas. Id.
216. The light bulb replacement project began in the summer of 2005. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE CONSUL-
TANTS, REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS 10 (Sept. 1, 2005–Dec. 31, 2005).
217. VCBC and GRVC are completed, BBKC required no changes, and the other facilities are in various stages
of completion.
218. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE CONSULTANTS, REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS 16 (May 1,
2006–Aug. 31, 2006).
41
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\52-1\NLR103.txt unknown Seq: 42 19-NOV-07 15:43
A NECESSARY AND PROPER ROLE FOR FEDERAL COURTS IN PRISON REFORM
and there has been no determination with respect to termination of the lighting
provisions of the consent decrees.219
d. Extreme Temperatures/Heat Sensitivity
In my 2001 Environmental Order, I directed the OCC to monitor the inside
temperature in each facility on each day when the outside temperature drops
below 55°F or exceeds 85°F.220  In the event that the ambient temperatures were
to fall below 55°F or exceed 85°F, then the warden and the director of environ-
mental health would be notified.  The DOC’s response to extreme temperature
conditions mirrored that of ventilation—i.e., experts were retained by DOC and
the parties.221  Upon review of information supplied by the parties and the OCC,
this court, on July 26, 2004, entered an Order (the “July 2004 Heat Order”) that
addressed the potential health risks to certain inmates from extreme temperature
conditions, and obliged the DOC to take certain precautions, triggered by the
outside temperature having reached 85°F.222  The July 2004 Heat Order pro-
vided for automatic termination on October 15, 2005 if “OCC does not find any
evidence of current and ongoing constitutional violations of plaintiffs’ federal
rights.”223  At the DOC’s behest this Order was subsequently amended in a De-
cember 22, 2004 Order (“December 2004 Amended Heat Order”).  Among other
things, the December 2004 Amended Heat Order listed medical conditions that
would render the detainee “heat-sensitive” and would require immediate transfer
to air-conditioned housing.224  The automatic termination provision was ex-
tended225 and the Heat Order remains in effect pending full compliance.226
219. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE CONSULTANTS, REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS 28–29 (May 1,
2007–Aug. 31, 2007).
220. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE CONSULTANTS, supra note 218, at 9.  The “outside temperature” represents the
temperature measured at LaGuardia Airport by the National Climatic Data Center (U.S. Dep’t of Com-
merce).  The temperature was to be monitored as to whether it dropped below 55°F, from October 1 until
May 31.  The temperature was to be monitored as to whether it exceeded 85°F on any day of the year.
The Order set forth at what times the inside temperature was to be monitored depending on whether the
outside temperature was above 85°F or below 55°F, in addition to detailing the method by which OCC
employees were to measure the inside temperature. Id.
221. By July 2003, the OCC retained an expert on issues associated with heat-related illness.  Benjamin v.
Horn, No. 75 Civ. 3073, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30211, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2006).
222. Id. at *2–3.
223. Id. at *3.
224. Benjamin v. Fraser, No. 75 Civ. 3703 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2004) (“amended Heat Order”) (listing medical
conditions used to identify inmates for air-conditioned housing: if the patient receives lithium, has Par-
kinson’s disease, requires infirmary care, is sixty-five years or older, has a documented history of hospitali-
zation for heatstroke, receives one or more drugs raising risk of heat-related illnesses, has type I or type II
diabetes, has dementia, suicidal tendencies, depression or mental retardation, or had a history of congestive
heart failure or myocardial infraction).
225. Due to the DOC’s failure to provide contemporaneous records during the summer of 2005, the automatic
termination provision was extended, by Order of October 14, 2005 to December 1, 2005, further extended
by Order of November 29, 2005 to December 31, 2005, and finally, by Order of December 22, 2005 until
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For several months in 2003 the parties and the OCC discussed the DOC’s
response to extreme temperature conditions227 to ensure that the facilities were
not unbearably hot in the summer or cold in the winter.228  By the end of 2005,
the DOC’s compliance efforts were, at best, stagnant.229  By 2006, however, the
DOC recorded some improvements.230  One notable accomplishment is the
DOC’s agreement and issuance of prisoner locator cards to signal the prisoner’s
heat-sensitive status to officers and staff and thus, facilitate their transfer to air-
conditioned housing.231  While there have been notable improvements, the chal-
lenge now is the timely transfer of heat-sensitive inmates to air-conditioned
housing.  On May 31, 2007, at the onset of New York’s summer heat, in an
attempt to ensure future compliance with past Orders in this area and protect
heat-sensitive inmates, I issued an Order which established a structure that in-
cludes fines for non-compliance in this area.  While I am hopeful that the end is
in sight, all the returns are not yet in.
such time the court decides that termination is proper.  Benjamin v. Horn, No. 75 Civ. 3073, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 30211, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2006).
226. Id.
227. Letter from John A. Horowitz, Office of Compliance Consultants, to the Honorable Harold Baer, Jr.
(Aug. 12, 2003) (on file with author).  The DOC and LAS more or less agreed that providing detainees
with blankets and extra clothing was a sufficient ameliorative measure on cold days.  On hot days, the
parties determined that with the exception of CPSU detainees, providing unlimited access to showers, and
providing ice during the afternoon hours would be sufficient. Id.
228. For the period January through April 2004, DOC recorded ninety days in which the temperatures in the
facilities reached below 68°F and seventeen days in which the temperatures in the facilities exceeded 85°F.
OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE CONSULTANTS, REPORT ON OCC-MONITORED CONDITIONS 11 (Jan. 1,
2004–Apr. 30, 2004).  During the next monitoring period, from May through August 2004, unsurpris-
ingly, the DOC recorded zero days in which the temperatures in the facilities reached below 68°F and
sixty-one days in which the temperatures in the facilities exceeded 85°F. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE CON-
SULTANTS, REPORT ON OCC-MONITORED CONDITIONS 11 (May 1, 2004–Aug. 31, 2004).  From Sep-
tember through December 2004, however, DOC recorded forty-seven days in which the temperatures in
the facilities reached below 68°F and six days in which the temperatures in the facilities exceeded 85°F.
OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE CONSULTANTS, REPORT ON OCC-MONITORED CONDITIONS 12 (Sept. 1,
2004–Dec. 31, 2004).
229. Benjamin v. Horn, No. 75 Civ. 3073, 7–8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2006).  During the period from September
through December 2005, DOC recorded eighty-three days in which the temperatures in the facilities
reached below 68°F and thirty-six days in which the temperatures in the facilities exceeded 85° F.
230. In the January through April 2006 monitoring period, DOC recorded forty-five days in which the tem-
peratures in the facilities reached below 68°F and nineteen days in which the temperatures in the facilities
exceeded 85°F. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE CONSULTANTS, REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS
10–11 (Jan. 1, 2006–Apr. 30, 2006).  From May through August 2006, DOC recorded seven days in
which the temperatures in the facilities reached below 68°F and forty-seven days in which the tempera-
tures in the facilities exceeded 85°F. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE CONSULTANTS, REPORT ON ENVIRON-
MENTAL CONDITIONS 10 (May 1, 2006–Aug. 31, 2006).
231. The DOC assigns particular colors to inmates to reflect their status. White signifies the inmate’s status as
“heat-sensitive.”  Theoretically, all cards and files associated with this inmate are the same color to provide
greater assurances that officers and other staff will respond to particular medical needs.  Teleconference
with Nicole Austin, Deputy Director of OCC (Apr. 18, 2007) (notes from teleconference on file with
author).
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2. Attorney Visitation
Almost from the beginning of my involvement with the case, LAS had com-
plained about attorney visitation problems such as the length of time both LAS
and non-LAS lawyers had to wait before they met with clients.  Indeed, after a
hearing in 2000, I found that defense lawyers frequently waited two hours or
longer after arriving at a facility before they met with their client.232  Defense
attorneys testified that the wait sometimes forced them to completely abandon
efforts to meet with clients after coming all the way to Rikers.233
I observed that several factors contributed to these delays. First, many De-
partment facilities had few counsel rooms relative to the number of detainees
housed at the facility.234  Second, certain detainees could not be moved to counsel
rooms without escort officers.235  Third, inmates were generally not brought to
counsel rooms during inmate counts, which at times delayed visits for several
hours.236  Because the counts were held at unpredictable times and the Depart-
ment did not furnish schedules, attorneys could not time their visits to avoid the
counts.237  The Department’s bureau chief for management and planning con-
ceded that security considerations did not require the freeze of inmate movement
during counts, and that while detainees were not brought to a visit with their
attorney during counts, they were taken to family visits.238  Defendants agreed
that transporting detainees to meet with their attorney during counts would not
lead to security or administrative problems.239
I found that attorney-client visitation had been significantly compromised
by these delays.240  Several LAS attorneys testified that they had largely stopped
visiting clients at particular facilities, and that the delays deterred necessary con-
sultation, particularly given that LAS attorneys typically handle sixty to one
232. Benjamin v. Kerik, 102 F. Supp. 2d 157, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).  As mentioned earlier, in my June 2000
decision, I held that prospective relief was available regarding the delays in inmates’ meetings with coun-
sel.  In September 2001, the Second Circuit affirmed my decision in its entirety. See  Benjamin v. Fraser,
264 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2001).
233. Benjamin v. Fraser, 264 F.3d at 180.
234. Id. at 179.  At the time, the ratio of counsel rooms to detainees varied dramatically between different
department facilities. NIC, with 476 detainees, had only one counsel room. The ratio of rooms to detainees




238. Id. at 179–80.
239. Id. at 180.
240. Benjamin v. Kerik, 102 F. Supp. 2d 157, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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hundred cases at a time.241  I also found that courthouse visits were not an ade-
quate substitute for jailhouse visits for a variety of reasons.242
In an August 2000 Order (the “August 2000 Attorney Visitation Order”), I
instructed defendants to, among other things, establish procedures to ensure that
attorney visits commence in a timely manner (within thirty to forty-five min-
utes),243 that an adequate number of attorney rooms were available,244 and that
they afford the requisite degree of privacy.245
The DOC’s compliance with the attorney delay aspect of the August 2000
Attorney Visitation Order was outstanding.  By 2003 and throughout 2004, the
DOC’s compliance rate with respect to the steps the DOC was required to take to
rectify delays hovered, without fail, at about 95 percent.246  Confidential attor-
ney visiting rooms progressed a bit more slowly, but the DOC worked toward
241. Benjamin v. Fraser, 264 F.3d 175, 180 (2d Cir. 2001).  For example, LAS attorney Heidi Segal testified:
Because you know you’re experiencing significant delays . . . you make determinations about
whether or not you even have the time to visit a client, so there are times that you would
forego a visit if you only had four hours free that day as opposed to six or seven. On days
. . . where I experienced significant delays, I would cut short my visit . . . .
Id.
242. Benjamin v. Kerik, 102 F. Supp. 2d at 176–77.  Courthouse visits were not available on less than a day’s
notice, nor in the evenings or on weekends.  Attorneys were required to call every hour to see if their client
has been produced.  Inmates might be returned to jail before the attorney arrives, or might not be produced
at all.  Some of the counsel rooms at the courthouses are not private, creating another problem the court
was asked to resolve.  Finally, when attorneys rely on courthouse visits, the burden on the client may cause
the attorney-client relationship to suffer.  Inmates are awakened at 4:00 a.m. for transport to court and
may wait eight hours in a bullpen to see their attorney.  Depending on their restraint status, inmates may
spend the entire day in restraints in order to meet with their attorney for a few minutes. Id.; see also
Benjamin v. Fraser, 264 F.3d. at 180.
243. Benjamin v. Kerik, No. 75 Civ. 3073 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2000) (“Order on attorney visitation”).  Attorney
visits were to commence within forty-five minutes of the time that an attorney or his agent checks in at
the Riker’s Island Control Building, or within thirty minutes of the time that an attorney checks into a
facility located off of Riker’s Island. Id .
244. The number of attorney rooms available at each facility would be based on a historical analysis of the
number of attorney visits to each facility for the past two years. Id .
245. Id .  I also ordered defendants to (1) establish procedures that include (i) taking and immediately address-
ing complaints by attorneys waiting longer than forty-five minutes at Riker’s Island or longer than thirty
minutes at a borough facility, (ii) allowing attorneys to make appointments to see a prisoner in advance,
and (iii) a plan to audit compliance; (2) submit the aforementioned in the form of a proposed directive to
the court and the plaintiffs for review within thirty days and for comment and amendment by the court;
and (3) report to the court quarterly on their compliance with the terms of the Order. Id.
246. From October through December 2003, there was 95 percent compliance with my August 2000 Order.
N.Y. CITY DEP’T OF CORR. INSPECTIONAL SERVICES COMPLIANCE DIVISION, ATTORNEY VISIT MONI-
TORING REPORT (Oct. 1, 2003–Dec. 31, 2003).  From January through March 2004, the combined com-
pliance rate for all the jails was 94.67 percent. N.Y. CITY DEP’T OF CORR. INSPECTIONAL SERVICES
COMPLIANCE DIVISION, ATTORNEY VISIT MONITORING REPORT (Jan. 1, 2004–Mar. 31, 2004).  For the
period of April through June 2004, there was a 94.49 percent compliance rate. N.Y. CITY DEP’T OF
CORR. INSPECTIONAL SERVICES COMPLIANCE DIVISION, ATTORNEY VISIT MONITORING REPORT (Apr.
1, 2004–June 31, 2004).  From July through September 2004, there was a combined compliance rate of
94.63 percent. N.Y. CITY DEP’T OF CORR. INSPECTIONAL SERVICES COMPLIANCE DIVISION, ATTORNEY
VISIT MONITORING REPORT (July 1, 2004–Sept. 30, 2004).  From October through December 2004,
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compliance with my Order. By August 2006, the rooms were constructed and the
Order was terminated.247
3. Red I.D./Restraint Status Due Process
Red I.D. detainees include those detainees found to possess a weapon while
in the custody of the Department of Correction.  Red I.D. detainees are permitted
to move within the jails without physical restraints, but when Red I.D. detainees
are moved anywhere outside their facility, their hands are fitted with black tubes
termed “security mitts,” and are cuffed behind the back with their hands facing
outwards.248 The cuffs may also be attached to their waist chain and leg irons.249
Restraint status is more restrictive than Red I.D.250  Individuals are desig-
nated as such when, according to the DOC, they have committed a violent act
while in the DOC’s custody.251  Restraint status detainees are subject to the same
restraints as Red I.D. detainees but, in addition, they are restrained anytime they
are moved within the jail.252
Red I.D. and restraint status are extraordinary and painful limitations on
the liberty of pre-trial detainees and LAS sought to restrict their use.253  On
August 10, 2000, I issued an Order (the “August 2000 Restraints Order”) to
address several due process issues, including that of prompt hearings and periodic
medical reviews for detainees with these designations.254
With respect to the appeals process, this Order required, among other things,
that (1) within seventy-two hours of placing a detainee in Red I.D. and/or en-
hanced restraint status, the DOC must afford said inmate a hearing in accor-
dance with Wolff v. McDonnell,255 and (2) the facility’s deputy warden for
security shall review appeals of such placements and render a written decision
within seven days of receiving an appeal from a detainee.256  With respect to
periodic medical reviews, the August 2000 Restraints Order also provided,
among other things, that the Department provide a monthly medical review of
there was 95.92 percent compliance with my Order. N.Y. CITY DEP’T OF CORR. INSPECTIONAL SER-
VICES COMPLIANCE DIVISION, ATTORNEY VISIT MONITORING REPORT (Oct. 1, 2004–Dec. 31, 2004).
247. Benjamin v. Kerik, No. 75 Civ. 3073, at 1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2006) (“Order terminating attorney
visitation Order”).




252. Id.  For example, restraint status detainees are restrained even when they are moved to the recreation
area or law library.
253. Benjamin v. Kerik, 102 F. Supp. 2d 157, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
254. Benjamin v. Kerik, No. 75 Civ. 3073, at 2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2000).
255. 418 U.S. 539 (1972).
256. Benjamin v. Kerik, No. 75 Civ. 3073, at 2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2000).
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the health of prisoners subject to Red I.D. status and restraint status.257  Finally,
the August 2000 Restraints Order directed defendants to draft procedures ensur-
ing that the terms of the Order would be implemented and to report to the court
on a quarterly basis with respect to compliance with the terms of the Order.258
In September 2002, I granted LAS’s contempt motion with respect to the DOC’s
noncompliance with portions of the August 2000 Restraints Order.259
Improvements in this area have been significant considering the circum-
stances.  The parties and the OCC worked together to create a system whereby
whenever a detainee is placed on a physical restraint status, the initial placement
form as well as the medical review form signed by a member of the facility’s
medical staff are immediately faxed to the OCC.260  In 2003, the OCC identified
only nine detainees who did not receive a medical review within the requisite
period.261  This number dropped to six by 2004.262   Because of the DOC’s re-
257. Id. at 3.
258. Id. at 3–4.  On December 15, 2000, by memo endorsement, the court approved defendants’ proposed
procedures (known as Directive 4518) and advised that they be made effective as soon as conveniently
possible but in no event later than December 31, 2000.  Benjamin v. Fraser, No. 75 Civ. 3073, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 18342, *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
259. I imposed monetary sanctions and other prospective relief. See Benjamin v. Fraser, No. 75 Civ. 3073,
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18342 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2002). For example, defendants would be fined $200
each and every time they fail to provide an initial hands-on medical review within forty-eight hours of a
prisoner being placed in Red I.D. and/or enhanced restraint status and $250 for each succeeding twenty-
four hours without such a review, the fine to be deposited in the prisoner’s account, or $200 each time they
fail to issue a written decision within seven days from receiving an inmate’s appeal and/or are unable to
provide documentation thereof, and $500 for each successive day of failed response, the fine to be deposited
in the inmate’s account. Id. at *38–42. In my opinion and Order, I found that none of the reviews
required under my August 2000 Order occurred until the end of 2001.  However, I also found that when
the reviews did occur in 2001, 95 percent of the documented appeals were decided within seven days, and
for the first quarter of 2002, 93 percent of the documented appeals were decided within seven days. Id.
260. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE CONSULTANTS, REPORT ON OCC-MONITORED CONDITIONS 13 (Jan. 1,
2003–Apr. 30, 2003).  Subsequent to my September 2002 Order, the OCC began to monitor compliance
and to work with the parties to achieve compliance on the August 2000 Order.  Benjamin v. Kerik, No.
75 Civ. 3073 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2000) (“Order regarding restraint due process”); OFFICE OF COMPLI-
ANCE CONSULTANTS, REPORT ON OCC-MONITORED CONDITIONS 2 (Aug. 1, 2002–Dec. 31, 2002).
261. From January through April 2003, the OCC identified two detainees who had not received a medical
review within the requisite period. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE CONSULTANTS, REPORT ON OCC-MONI-
TORED CONDITIONS 13 (Jan. 1, 2003–Apr. 30, 2003). From May through August 2003, the OCC iden-
tified six detainees who had not received a medical review within the requisite period. OFFICE OF
COMPLIANCE CONSULTANTS, REPORT ON OCC-MONITORED CONDITIONS 9 (May 1, 2003–Aug. 31,
2003).  On June 9, 2003, the court signed an Order instructing the DOC to pay a fine to three affected
inmates. Id. From September through December 2003, the OCC found one detainee who did not receive
a medical review within the requisite period. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE CONSULTANTS, REPORT ON
OCC-MONITORED CONDITIONS 14 (Sept. 1, 2003–Dec. 31, 2003).  In addition, the OCC identified one
detainee who did not receive within the mandated period a written answer to a Red I.D. appeal. Id.
262. From January through August 2004, the OCC did not identify any detainees who failed to receive a
medical review within the requisite period or whose appeals were not decided within the requisite period.
OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE CONSULTANTS, REPORT ON OCC-MONITORED CONDITIONS 17 (Jan. 1,
2004–Apr. 30, 2004); OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE CONSULTANTS, REPORT ON OCC-MONITORED CONDI-
TIONS 17 (May 1, 2004–Aug. 31, 2004).  From September through December 2004, the OCC identified
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markable compliance, in May 2006, my August 2000 Order terminated subject to
the DOC instituting a system to track Red I.D. detainees.263
4. Fire Safety
In 1988, the OCC engaged a fire safety expert to tour the DOC facilities
and to advise the OCC and the parties of his findings. The expert found “[o]vert
fire safety hazards, e.g., combustion dangers, absence of fire warnings, exit signs
and evacuation plans.”264  It was not until August 1990 that the City retained a
consulting firm to conduct a comprehensive examination of the infrastructures of
Rikers and North Brothers Island, which included an extensive evaluation of fire
alarm systems.265  The firm’s findings and recommendations, which were
presented to the OCC and LAS in June 1991, provided the basis for the DOC’s
1992 Fire Safety Master Plan (“FSMP”).266
In late 1989, the DOC’s own internal Fire and Safety Unit began reporting
serious violations in the jails. For example, the fire alarm system at OBCC was
deemed “unreliable and/or inoperable,” and was reported to have been in this
condition since shortly after the jail opened in 1985.267  In February 1992, the
Fire and Safety Unit reported that GRVC was “without an operable smoke/fire
alarm system” and that “[t]his condition has existed since the facility opened for
operation in 1991.”268  Later that year, the Unit reported that the fire alarm,
smoke detection, and smoke purge systems at the Manhattan Detention Center
had been inoperable since 1983.269
six detainees who were placed in Red I.D. without receiving medical review within the requisite period.
OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE CONSULTANTS, REPORT ON OCC-MONITORED CONDITIONS 18 (Sept. 1,
2004–Dec. 31, 2004).  The OCC also found that all inmate appeals were decided within the requisite
period. Id. at 19.
263. Benjamin v. Fraser, No. 75 Civ. 3073 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2006) (“Order regarding Red I.D. status”).
264. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE CONSULTANTS, PROGRESS REPORT #19 27 (Mar. 1, 1988–Aug. 31, 1988).
The DOC subsequently agreed to provide the OCC and LAS with a date by which it would produce cost
estimates and a plan for remediation of fire safety issues.
265. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE CONSULTANTS, PROGRESS REPORT #31 2–3 (Nov. 1992–Mar. 1993).
266. Id.
267. N.Y. CITY DEP’T OF CORR. FIRE AND SAFETY UNIT, FIRE AND SAFETY INSPECTION OF OTIS BANTUM
CORRECTION CENTER 1 (Oct./Nov. 1989).
268. N.Y. CITY DEP’T OF CORR. FIRE AND SAFETY UNIT, FIRE AND SAFETY INSPECTION OF THE GEORGE R.
VIERNO CENTER 1 (Feb. 1992).
269. N.Y. CITY DEP’T OF CORR. FIRE AND SAFETY UNIT, FIRE AND SAFETY INSPECTION OF MANHATTAN
DETENTION CENTER (NORTH AND SOUTH TOWERS) 3 (May 1992).  During this period, the OCC also
began to document serious fire safety hazards at several of the larger facilities on Rikers Island.  In 1992,
the OCC reported, “[t]en of the modular units at ARDC are not properly hooked into the Control Room”
and that “none of the fire alarm pull stations work” at AMKC. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE CONSULTANTS,
OCC PROGRESS REPORT #29 22 (Oct. 1, 1991–Feb. 28, 1992).
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By the end of 1995, the parties had resolved all disputes regarding fire
safety at AMKC, except for the issue of smoke detection.270  By 1996, the parties
agreed to evaluate the fire safety plans for six jails individually.271
On December 9, 1999, I ordered the OCC to complete, through its retained
consultants, an assessment of fire safety conditions in the remaining jails by April
1, 2000.272  In early 2006, the fire safety expert surveyed fire safety in
AMKC.273  To date, although fire safety in AMKC is far from ideal, he found
several areas of improvement, which included the installation of: (1) sprinklers in
the majority of areas containing high combustible loads (such as storage areas), (2)
smoke detectors on the first floor in the main corridor of building A, and (3) a
new manual fire alarm system in AMKC housing units one through five.274
Apart from these improvements, he did not find that fire hazards at AMKC
overall had changed since 1993.275  Fire safety continues to be a concern and
requires continued attention from the court and the parties.276
5. Modular Housing Units
The modular housing units on Rikers Island are generally one-story wood-
framed structures appended to the ARDC, AMKC, GMDC, and RMSC.277  All
270. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE CONSULTANTS, OCC PROGRESS REPORT #39 4 (July 1, 1995–Dec. 15, 1995).
In December 1995, however, the DOC indicated that it no longer accepted the concept of a court-ordered
fire safety work plan and instead offered to submit to the OCC and LAS its updated FSMP. Id. at 3–4.
271. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE CONSULTANTS, OCC PROGRESS REPORT #41 11 (May 1, 1996–Aug. 30,
1996).  In February of 1993, the OCC retained a fire safety expert and registered engineer, Thomas
Jaeger, to evaluate the DOC’s Fire Safety Master Plan.  He is president of Jaeger & Associates, LLC, a
consulting fire protection engineering firm and an officer of the National Fire Protection Association.
National Fire Protection Association, http://www.nfpa.org/itemDetail.asp?categoryID=503&itemID=
18013&URL=About%20Us/Board%20of%20Directors/Second%20Vice%20Chair (last visited Sept. 16,
2007).  Mr. Jaeger’s evaluations of the jails were suspended in 1996 pending resolution of the City’s
motion to terminate the consent decrees. Id .  The OCC’s fire safety expert evaluated the DOC FSMP for
AMKC in 1993, BKHD in 1995, and MDC in 1997.  In each case, he concluded that the proposed plan
was inadequate because it would not correct the majority of the fire safety deficiencies and, if fully imple-
mented, would not provide a fire safe environment to the occupants of the facility. In April 1997, I
ordered the City to provide the OCC with its FSMP, and instructed the City that I expected the plan to
be substantially equivalent in detail to the Plan provided in 1992.  In May 26, May 27, and June 1
through June 3, 1998, I held hearings on the status of fire safety.  In November 1998, I issued a decision
with findings with respect to the BXHD and BKHD.
272. Benjamin v. Kerik, No. 75 Civ. 3073 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 1999) (“Order on motion to terminate prospective
relief”).
273. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE CONSULTANTS, REPORT ON OCC-MONITORED CONDITIONS 19 (May 1,
2004–Aug. 31, 2004).
274. Id. at 5.
275. Id. at 16.
276. See generally, Eugene B. Pepper, Sanitation Inspections for New York City Jail Facilities at Rikers
Island (Mar. 3, 2006).
277. Benjamin v. Kerik, No. 75 Civ. 3073, 1998 WL 799161, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 1998).  For explana-
tion of acronyms, see supra note 184.
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modular units at AMKC, ARDC, and GMDC were installed in 1987, except
that modular two of ARDC was installed in 1990.278  In February 1996, a reg-
istered sanitarian completed an assessment of the wood framed modular units
located in AMKC, ARDC, and GMDC.279  His report concluded that the “over-
all conditions of the wooden modular units were so poor as to be unhealthful and
potentially unsafe for the occupants.”280  Among other things, he noted significant
deterioration of the building structures, unclean and unsanitary conditions, and
insufficient light and ventilation.281  There was some discussion about whether
the modular housing units should be destroyed because of their atrocious condi-
tions and fire safety concerns but, at the time, the City opined that it could not
house its prisoners without the use of the modular units.
In February and March 2006, the OCC visited the modular units to assess
the safety of the fire systems that had been installed between February 1994 and
January 1995 pursuant to court Order.282  The OCC found the modular fire
safety systems to be in an appalling state of disrepair.283
In 1997, the City began to replace the defective roofs by using a sprayed
foam roofing system.284 This system appears to have reduced the number of leaks
and damage to fire safety equipment.285  However, in 2006, I ordered a total of
eight modular units located in AMKC, ARDC, GMDC, and RMSC be shut
down and demolished because the units were grossly unsafe and replete with
health hazards.286  The DOC has inspected the modular units and has issued a
278. WARD DUEL, ENVIRONMENTAL EVALUATION 4 (Feb. 1996).
279. WARD DUEL, ENVIRONMENTAL EVALUATION 1 (Feb. 1996).
280. WARD DUEL, ENVIRONMENTAL EVALUATION 4 (Feb. 1996).
281. See WARD DUEL, ENVIRONMENTAL EVALUATION 1–4 (Feb. 1996).
282. OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE CONSULTANTS, OCC PROGRESS REPORT #40 15 (Dec. 16, 1995–Apr. 30,
1996).
283. Id . at 16.  In its report the OCC stated that:
The alarm systems in seven of the sixteen modulars were completely inoperable and, in
some cases, had not worked for over a year; the sprinkler systems in twelve modulars were
not operating as designed due to problems associated with the fire alarm systems; six fire
alarm control panels had been vandalized by Department staff and three had been dam-
aged by water leaking through the roof and could not be repaired until the warranty agree-
ment; and the electromagnetic door lock systems in all three modulars at [ARDC] were
inoperable.  In addition, facility maintenance and management staff generally did not
know how to operate or maintain the modular fire safety systems, and equipment and
components were not being periodically cleaned, tested or inspected by NYFD, as required
by the two-year warranty contract.
Id .
284. Benjamin v. Kerik, No. 75 Civ. 3073, 1998 WL 799161, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 1998).
285. Id .
286. Benjamin v. Horn, No. 75 Civ. 3073, at 2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2006) (“Order regarding modular housing
units”) (“[I]n light of their structural and other defects, [the units] shall never again be used for inmate
occupancy and shall be demolished, if they have not already been demolished, at a time to be determined by
the Department of Correction.”).
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report in which it concludes that there are no immediate structural safety con-
cerns with regard to the occupied housing modulars.287 Consequently, and for the
moment, the modulars remain standing but because of a significantly reduced
count in the prison population, few prisoners are housed in them.  As noted at the
outset of this article, consent decrees are a reactive and not proactive instrument
and without the plaintiff moving against such a report from the DOC, I am not
likely to do more.
6. Summary
It is apparent that there have been significant improvements and signifi-
cant delays in the way in which the DOC has complied with court Orders, and
this noncompliance has plagued the court since the inception of this litigation.288
On the other hand, except for fire safety, sanitation, and some issues regarding
heat-sensitive detainees, the areas that remain before the court after the PLRA
are few and far between, and in most, court oversight has terminated.  Most
importantly, it is clear that under judicial supervision, City jails and those forced
to live there, are, for the most part, living in conformity with constitutional
guaranties.  The detail, which to some may seem overwhelming, has been pro-
vided to help the reader decide for herself whether there could and should be a
better way to assure minimal constitutional guaranties to detainees in New York
City jails.
III. CONSENT DECREES VS. PRIVATE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
To evaluate the relative value of the Benjamin consent decrees, it is impor-
tant to look not only at the significant improvements at Rikers that have come
about as the result of the consent decrees, but also at other approaches taken by the
Judiciary to address similar complaints.  The PLRA provides for two separate
and distinct remedies; both employ settlement concepts.  In both consent decrees
and private settlements, the parties are able to settle a lawsuit on mutually ac-
ceptable terms that the court agrees to enforce as a judgment.  The critical differ-
ence is that a consent decree affords ongoing monitoring and enforcement
mechanisms not provided in a private settlement.
Under the provisions of the PLRA, a federal court cannot enter or approve
prospective relief pursuant to a consent decree unless the relief is (1) narrowly
drawn, (2) reaches no further than needed to correct the infringement, and (3)
287. Id. at 1.
288. It is worth noting that one significant milestone often absent from the discussion is the dramatic change in
the physical appearance of Rikers.  Most recently on my annual visit to Rikers to tour the facilities, I was
struck by the overall improvements in the physical structure—fewer missing tiles, cleaner showers and
bathrooms, and in certain areas, newly painted walls.  I could not help but wonder whether these aesthetic
improvements coincided with the overall progression in the jails since the onset of the decrees.  Though
compliance is not yet complete, and issues remain, the aesthetic improvements are noteworthy.
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provides the least intrusive means to correct the violation.289  By definition, this
form of “prospective relief” requires a finding by the court or admission by the
defendant that a federal right has indeed been violated.  By contrast, private
settlements do not require the same finding or admission.290  In addition, private
settlements lack any judicial enforcement other than the reinstatement of the pro-
ceeding under certain circumstances.291  In these instances, plaintiffs may return
to the federal court that approved the settlement, seek to have the case reinstated
and then proceed to trial.  Alternatively, plaintiffs may initiate a breach of con-
tract action in state court and seek specific performance.
Consent decrees are defined as “any relief entered by the court that is based
in whole or in part upon the consent or acquiescence of the parties but does not
include private settlements.”292  A private settlement agreement “means an
agreement entered into among the parties that is not subject to judicial enforce-
ment other than the reinstatement of the civil proceeding that the agreement
settled.”293
Not surprisingly, there are reasons that plaintiffs would prefer a consent
decree while defendants would favor private settlements.  First, plaintiffs may
opt for a consent decree because of the implicit finding that a violation of a fed-
eral right has occurred.  Second, the court that enters a consent decree also retains
jurisdiction over it.  As a result, plaintiffs are not required to file an independent
lawsuit every time the other party violates a provision of the consent decree.
Plaintiffs may also prefer a consent decree because it involves court monitoring
and thereby accelerates compliance.  Defendants may be more apt to comply
promptly because a failure to act in accordance with the terms of a consent decree
may be met with a contempt order.  As discussed earlier, this is how the OCC
came into existence.  The court may also serve to interpret the consent decree to
289. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (2000) states:
Prospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison conditions shall extend no fur-
ther than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or
plaintiffs.  The court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court finds
that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the viola-
tion of the Federal right and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of
the Federal right.  The court shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public
safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief.
290. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(c)(2) (2000) states:
(A) Nothing in this section shall preclude parties from entering into a private settlement
agreement that does not comply with the limitations on relief set forth in subsection (a), if
the terms of that agreement are not subject to court enforcement other than the reinstate-
ment of the civil proceeding that the agreement settled.
(B) Nothing in this section shall preclude any party claiming that a private settlement
agreement has been breached from seeking in State court any remedy available under State
law.
291. Id .
292. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(1) (2000).
293. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(6) (2000).
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help the parties resolve any ongoing disputes before they reach litigation.
Finally, plaintiffs may prefer consent decrees to private settlements because the
consent decree is generally easier to modify if circumstances change.  Private set-
tlement agreements do not afford the same flexibility and plaintiffs are limited in
the remedies they may seek.
It is also apparent why defendants would find private settlements to be a
more attractive solution.  For example, in a private settlement, there is no find-
ing of a violation of a federal right.  In a private settlement, a governmental
defendant need not admit to any wrongdoing.  In addition, the defendant will
usually prefer not to have the judicial oversight inherent in consent decrees.
Whatever the preferences of plaintiffs and defendants, the private settlement
arrangement is increasingly being used in lieu of consent decrees.294  For exam-
ple, Judge Chin recently presided over a settlement in Ingles v. Toro,295 a com-
parable case involving another plaintiff class of detainees at Rikers Island.
Inmates of various institutions operated by the DOC filed a civil rights action
against the City alleging excessive force in its prisons and detention facilities.296
After four years of negotiations, Judge Chin helped the parties reach a settlement.
In the settlement, the affirmative duties taken on by the DOC in order to
better monitor the use of force and perhaps stop the use of excessive force are not
dissimilar to some of the obligations of the DOC under the Benjamin consent
decrees.  The agreement between the parties will remain in effect until November
1, 2009, at which time the federal court will lose any authority to compel the
City’s compliance.  In such a private settlement agreement, if plaintiffs believe
the City has not complied with its duties—or in effect has breached its agree-
ment—plaintiffs only recourse is to move before Judge Chin to have the case
reinstated and proceed to trial.297  Of course, plaintiffs may also commence an
action in state court for breach of contract, but this is tantamount to starting the
litigation all over again.
The ability of plaintiffs to come to the court and urge compliance is why the
Benjamin consent decrees have been so effective in the long term.  In cases like
Benjamin, violations once remedied can backslide and become a violation of
rights once again.  This was most strikingly obvious in instances of sanitation
and overcrowding throughout the years.  The consent decree, unlike the private
settlement agreement, allows for the necessary flexibility without forcing plain-
tiffs to file new lawsuits and start over each time the conditions at the facility
become constitutionally objectionable.  Settlements may be appropriate in some
294. See, e.g., Laube v. Campbell, 333 F. Supp. 2d 1234 (M.D. Ala. 2004); Ingles v. Toro, 438 F. Supp. 2d
203 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Billips v. Horn, No. 04 Civ. 1086 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2005) (stipulation of settle-
ment and dismissal).
295. Ingles v. Toro, 438 F. Supp. 2d 203 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
296. Id. at 204.
297. Id. at 210; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3626(c) (2000).
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situations, but seemingly, only a consent decree, like the decrees in Benjamin,
provides for the necessary oversight to ensure success in protecting the rights of
the disenfranchised as guaranteed by the Constitution.
In Ingles , that the agreement between the parties was a private settlement
rather than consent decree was an important consideration for the City.  One of
its goals in entering the settlement was that the commissioner should not cede any
of his authority or discretion.298
The City took a similar approach in another case that came before me in
2004.  In Billips v. Horn, inmates sued the City and claimed that the DOC did
not appropriately credit their jail time when inmates were in the hospital for
either physical or emotional afflictions.299  The DOC recognized the need for a
more adequate policy and system to track this information so that the time could
be deducted from inmates’ sentences.  Rather than admit a federal right had been
violated or endure a trial on this issue, the City, with approval from plaintiffs
represented by LAS, developed a plan of settlement.  Under this plan, the DOC
would remedy the problem by setting up computerized systems to track this infor-
mation.300  The DOC would also provide a quarterly report and have necessary
conferences with the court, but at the end of two years of monitoring, the court’s
authority would end.
Like many policy and institutional changes, personnel and technology ad-
justments to account for those time credits could not be instituted overnight.  The
DOC needed time to set up computer systems and software to track inmates and
their time spent in hospital.  The settlement agreement gave the DOC only a
year to put those systems in place and then another two years of monitoring by
the court to ensure ongoing compliance.
Billips and Ingles  are decidedly different from the ongoing heat and sani-
tation problems in the City’s jails.   I approved the private settlement in Billips
because I did not believe that plaintiffs could have found any greater degree of
relief if the issue had been litigated.  Judge Chin had the same view in Ingles .301
It is also important to note that the settlement agreements in Billips and
Ingles  provided for a compliance-monitoring period.302  It did not, however,
provide for any mechanism for the court to sanction non-compliance.  It merely
allowed for the cases to be reinstated, thus complying with the stringent parame-
ters of private settlements pursuant to the PLRA.  This was the most troubling
part of my decision to approve the settlement in Billips, but because the City had
arranged very specific and concrete plans for compliance and because I believed
298. Ingles , 438 F. Supp. 2d at 210; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3626(c) (2000).
299. Billips v. Horn, No. 04 Civ. 1086 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2005) (stipulation of settlement and dismissal).
300. Id.
301. Ingles , 438 F. Supp. 2d at 214.
302. Id. at 209 (“The agreement will remain in effect until November 1, 2009 . . . .”).
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the relief was the most defendants could achieve, I approved it, despite the loss of
any ongoing oversight.
IV. THE FEDERAL CONSENT DECREE FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005
Ongoing consent decrees like the ones in Benjamin have prompted Congress
to take a closer look at what might be done to further limit the role of the judici-
ary in the enforcement of constitutional standards in our public institutions and
has led to a bill entitled the Federal Consent Decree Fairness Act of 2005
(“Bill”).303  The Bill was introduced at least ostensibly in response to what its
supporters claim is a trend by the judiciary to wrest “public policy decisions from
the control of elected officials—the governor, the legislature, the mayor, the city
counsel—and put them indefinitely in the hands of a small group of plaintiff’s
attorneys and an unelected federal judiciary.”304
Encouragement for the Bill came from a book by Ross Sandler and David
Schoenbrod, Democracy by Decree: What Happens When Courts Run Gov-
ernment, and a conference held on the subject by the American Enterprise Insti-
tute, a conservative think tank.305  Primarily, the Bill attempts to make it easier
for a city or state to vacate or modify a consent decree.306  The text of the Bill
spells out numerous “congressional findings” that are meant to provide insight
into the use of consent decrees.307  It asserts that: (1) consent decrees are for reme-
dying violations of rights and may not be used to advance other policies, (2)
consent decrees should give deference to local officials, and (3) consent decrees
should contain realistic strategies for ending court supervision.308
Based on these “findings,” the Bill introduces several blanket limitations to
consent decrees.  First, it authorizes state or local governments and related offi-
cials sued in their official capacity to file a motion to modify or vacate a consent
decree upon the earlier of (1) four years after the consent decree is originally
303. Federal Consent Decree Fairness Act, S. 489, 109th Cong. (2005); Federal Consent Decree Fairness Act ,
H.R. 1229, 109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter Federal Consent Decree Fairness Act].
304. Federal Consent Decree Fairness Act: Hearing on S. 489 Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Over-
sight and the Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 3 (2005) [hereinafter Senate
Judiciary Committee Hearings]; see also Federal Consent Decree Fairness Act: Hearing on S. 489
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the Committee of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter House Judiciary Committee Hearings].
305. See ROSS SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN COURTS
RUN GOVERNMENT (2003); Symposium, Governing By Consent Decree?, American Enterprise Insti-
tute, (June 9, 2005) http://www.aei.org/events/eventID.1078/event_detail.asp (transcript available at
http://www.aei.org/events/filter.,eventID.1078/transcript.asp).
306. Federal Consent Decree Fairness Act, S. 489, 109th Cong. (2005); Federal Consent Decree Fairness Act ,
H.R. 1229, 109th Cong. (2005).
307. Federal Consent Decree Fairness Act, S. 489, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005); Federal Consent Decree Fairness
Act, H.R. 1229, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005).
308. Federal Consent Decree Fairness Act, S. 489, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005); Federal Consent Decree Fairness
Act, H.R. 1229, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005).
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entered; or (2) in the case of a civil action in which a state or a local government
is a party, the expiration of the term of office of the highest elected state or local
government official authorizing the consent decree.309  Second, the Bill shifts the
burden of proof to plaintiffs “to demonstrate that the continued enforcement of a
consent decree is necessary to uphold a federal right.”310  Third, it nullifies con-
sent decrees pending a ruling on a motion to modify or vacate if the court fails to
rule on such a motion within ninety days of filing the motion.311  Finally, the Bill
purports to be applicable to all consent decrees regardless of when the consent
decree was entered and whether any relief has been obtained before its
enactment.312
Although it is not clear from the text or congressional hearings how exactly
this proposed law is meant to interact with the limitations already provided by
the PLRA, if directly applied, the Bill will most likely leave prisoners’ rights at
the cell door.  On its face it claims to apply to all consent decrees, but much of this
Bill echoes the parameters for the judiciary in the PLRA, which is similar in
scope and purpose, i.e., to limit the judiciary’s role with respect to consent decrees.
The structure and limitations are in many ways similar.  For example, both the
Bill and the PLRA provide for the automatic termination of any court order or
consent decree two years after entry of such relief.313  If there is a finding that the
consent decree has been violated, and the motion for termination is denied, the
motion may be renewed one year from the date of denial.314  This suggests that
despite the parallels, the two laws would operate independently of each other, but
unfortunately, there has not been enough discussion in Congress to answer this
question conclusively.
309. Federal Consent Decree Fairness Act, S. 489, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005); Federal Consent Decree Fairness
Act, H.R. 1229, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005) (proposing to amend Chapter 111 of title 28, United States Code,
with Sec. 1660(b)(1)(A-B)).
310. Federal Consent Decree Fairness Act, S. 489, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005); Federal Consent Decree Fairness
Act, H.R. 1229, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005) (proposing to amend Chapter 111 of title 28, United States Code,
with Sec. 1660(b)(2)).
311. Federal Consent Decree Fairness Act, S. 489, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005); Federal Consent Decree Fairness
Act, H.R. 1229, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005) (proposing to amend Chapter 111 of title 28, United States Code,
with Sec. 1660(b)(4)).
312. Federal Consent Decree Fairness Act, S. 489, 109th Cong. § 4 (2005); Federal Consent Decree Fairness
Act, H.R. 1229, 109th Cong. § 4 (2005)
313. 18 U.S.C. 3626(b)(1) (2000), which reads as follows:
(A) In any civil action with respect to prison conditions in which prospective relief is or-
dered, such relief shall be terminable upon the motion of any party or intervener—
(i) 2 years after the date the court granted or approved the prospective relief;
(ii) 1 year after the date the court has entered an order denying termination of prospective
relief under this paragraph; or
(iii) in the case of an order issued on or before the date of enactment of the Prison Litigation
Reform Act [enacted April 26, 1996], 2 years after such date of enactment.
314. Id.
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A. The Bill Provides Strict, Inflexible Time Limits
Supporters of the Bill argue that ongoing consent decrees linger too long,
outlive their usefulness, and become outdated.315  For example, Senator Lamar
Alexander discussed in the Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings a consent decree
entered in 1974 in New York City that established a form of bilingual education
for children.316  Now Senator Alexander claims that the parents of New York
City school children would like to have their children learn English in a different
type of class, but parents and school officials are bound by an outdated and obso-
lete consent decree.317  But for every parade of horribles that details how consent
decrees outlive their purpose, there are just as many instances where it took a
long time for government defendants to comply because of the resources and ex-
tensive work that was required to assure compliance.318
The Bill places strict limitations on the allowable duration of consent de-
crees; a state or local government that is party to a consent decree can request that
the decree be reviewed for termination after four years or a “change of control” in
administrations.319  The first and most obvious problem with this provision is
that it would give the government defendant an opportunity to challenge the
decree regardless of whether the affirmative duties provided in the consent decree
had been addressed.  For example, if a consent decree was entered in June and in
the November elections the incumbent administration was defeated the consent
decree would be subject to re-examination some six months after its entry.
Should a newly elected administration be given this fiat, and a consent decree be
so easily undone?
Senator Charles Schumer of New York hinted that he might be willing to
support a bill such as this if the time period were not tied to the political cycle, as
it is with a “change of control” provision.320  Senator Schumer suggested a limit
of any extension to ten years.321  But I am not certain that any specifically pre-
scribed length of time is appropriate in light of the burden shifting provision
discussed below.  A more effective device might entail some sort of periodic exam-
ination and written findings by the court.
The four year time limit combined with the “change of control” provisions in
the proposed Bill are too restrictive and deny courts the type of flexibility neces-
315. Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings, supra note 304, at 3 (statement of Sen. Lamar Alexander).
316. Id. at 4 (statement of Sen. Lamar Alexander).
317. Id.
318. For example, the New Orleans Sewerage and Water Board entered into a consent decree whereby the city
of New Orleans would take specific steps over eleven years to build a new sewage collection system because
the old one frequently caused raw human sewage to run into the streets.
319. Federal Consent Decree Fairness Act, S. 489, 109th Cong. (2005); Federal Consent Decree Fairness Act ,
H.R. 1229, 109th Cong. (2005).
320. Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings, supra note 304, at 16 (statement of Sen. Charles E. Schumer).
321. Id.
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sary to effectively enforce plaintiffs’ rights.  Even with the possibility for the
extension of the decree, a four year limit may defeat and clearly inhibit efforts
that deserve extended oversight.  The Benjamin consent decrees were first signed
in 1978 and have been sustained through five mayoral administrations.322  New
York City jails would never have seen the necessary and varied improvements
now in place, had Benjamin been subject to restrictions like those proposed in the
Bill and had subsequent mayors adopted Mayor Beame’s position.
It is also important to note that the Bill does not define precisely what con-
stitutes a “change in control.”  How many members of a city council or board of
supervisors, as Congressman Howard Berman pondered, must rotate or simply
be re-elected to implicate this change of control provision?323  Consent decrees
could face even shorter lives depending on the interpretation of such a provision.
B. The Bill Improperly Shifts the Burden of Proof to Plaintiffs to
Re-prove Violations
When a consent decree is reviewed by the court, the burden of proof to show
a need for continued enforcement of the consent decree will rest with the plaintiff
that initially sought the relief.324  Proponents provide a creative rationale for the
burden-shifting concept and opine that it is an advantage for plaintiffs because
“state or local officials must be able to overcome plaintiffs’ proof that the court is
still needed to prevent future violations.”325  This begs the question why, one
might ask, is extra burden placed on plaintiffs an advantage?  Why shouldn’t the
burden be left on the defendants to show compliance with the consent decree; after
all, wasn’t that the thrust of the litigation from the beginning?  Proponents also
point out that noncompliant officials face the certainty of judicial hearings and a
finding that there are violations.326  But noncompliant officials are currently
subject to judicial hearings and contempt if they fail to comply.  Portraying such a
burden shift as being favorable to plaintiffs is at best misleading.  Nor does this
change do anything to level the playing field.   It is the plaintiffs who generally
lack the resources to litigate and should not be made to re-prove violations at the
discretion of defendants.  Rather, the burden should remain on defendants to
show that they are in compliance.  Otherwise, this provision is little more than
an escape hatch for newly elected politicians who disagree with the previous ad-
322. This, of course, assumes arguendo that the Bill might apply to consent decrees that might also be governed
by the PLRA. See Benjamin v. Malcolm, 495 F. Supp. 1357, 1359 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
323. Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings, supra note 304, at 17 (statement of Prof. Ross Sandler, New
York Law School).
324. Federal Consent Decree Fairness Act, S. 489, 109th Cong. § 3; Federal Consent Decree Fairness Act,
H.R. 1229, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005).
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ministration’s view and disavow those undertakings.327  Further, jail and prison
inmates who seek to vindicate their constitutional rights may be prejudiced by
this provision. The legal resources available to inmates are limited and to force
inmates and their counsel to relitigate the merits of the underlying violations at
least every four years would further limit those already scarce funds.
Where a government defendant acknowledges an abridgment of constitu-
tional rights and voluntarily enters into a consent decree to remedy the abridg-
ment, plaintiffs should not then be required to re-prove their position every time
a new mayor takes office.  Many consent decrees involve ongoing and potentially
recurring problems, and to require the underrepresented plaintiff class to shoulder
such a burden is illogical.  From a probabilistic standpoint (based on history and
logic), it is more likely that government defendants have not made sufficient
changes to comply with the decree, and the defendant should bear the burden of
proving that the need for the decree no longer exists.  Unfortunately, the likely
reasons for such a request will be that a new mayor does not subscribe to the
agreement entered into by his or her predecessor, or has other plans for the
budget.
Our central concern throughout this article is that shifting responsibility for
these issues to the legislative branch would be for the most part an exercise in
futility.  In an era of enormous financial investments in campaigns and lobbying
legislative bodies, elected legislators have little incentive to look out for the inter-
ests of the powerless and disenfranchised, mostly because they don’t vote.  Without
the federal court and the opportunities for consent decrees and their enforcement
by the court, we have seen pre-trial detainees’ rights go unheeded.
C. The Bill Reduces Incentives for Plaintiffs to Settle
In light of the limitations described above, it is difficult to imagine a situa-
tion where plaintiffs would believe the relief offered through settlement is better
than what they could achieve through trial and, therefore, there is no incentive
for plaintiffs to negotiate and ask the court to enter a consent decree.  Congress-
man Howard Berman, the Ranking Democrat on the House Subcommittee on
the Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property, correctly voiced his doubts
about the Bill, when he opined that cities or states will as a matter of course move
to vacate or modify consent decrees in order to shift the burden to the plaintiff
who will be forced “to reprove [sic] his case simply because the defendant asked
for a review of the decree.”328  This raises a doubt as to whether plaintiffs would
have any incentive to settle their claims when the government holds a sword of
327. See, e.g., Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings, supra note 304, at 18 (statement of Prof. Timothy
Stoltzfus Jost, Wash. and Lee Univ. Sch. of Law) (suggesting that proponents of the Bill from Tennessee
wanted to pass the legislation to free themselves of consent decrees renegotiated in 2003 that were “no
longer convenient”).
328. Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings, supra note 304, at 6 (statement of Rep. Howard Berman).
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Damocles over the plaintiff’s head by being able, under certain circumstances, to
force a review almost immediately after a decree is entered.  Even if the remedies
outlined in a particular consent decree had not been adhered to by the defendant,
the plaintiff still bears the burden of re-proving the need for the continuation of
the decree.  Because plaintiffs know that the decree could be reviewed so fre-
quently (with the burden on the plaintiffs), they will be reluctant to agree to a
consent decree that might otherwise solve the problems and lead to a termination
of the decree.
Neither the plaintiffs nor the government defendants will be likely to enter
into a consent decree when they know the settlement could be void in four years,
or sooner depending on how the “change of control” provision is interpreted.
What would happen to consent decrees if after years of negotiations, one is finally
agreed to and entered but comes at the end of a mayor’s term?  A new mayor
would have the power to immediately review and dismantle the decree, whether
the problems addressed were solved or not.329
To add insult to injury, the Bill would tax the resources of the already un-
derfunded federal courts.  By reducing any incentive to settle, the Bill will in-
crease litigation in the federal courts and likely the number of trials.  Any
requirement that makes inmates “demonstrate” continued violations every fourth
year, or more frequently, will doubtless add to federal dockets around the country.
The requirement in the Bill that such motions be ruled on within ninety days
will only compound these resource issues.
Such limitations would make it increasingly difficult for judges to protect
the rights of inmates who should be able to rely on and expect that their hard
fought for remedy will be enforced.  This is what happened in the early days of
the Benjamin consent decrees and had those plaintiffs been forced to re-file their
claims or periodically prove that constitutional violations remained, I doubt there
would have been much, if any, improvement in conditions experienced in the
1960s and 1970s when this lawsuit began and the jails were at their worst.
Oswald Spengler’s cyclical view of history would once again be dramatically
played out at the expense of the powerless.330
D. The Court Will Not Be More Effective in Enforcing Consent
Decrees
Likewise, the argument that courts will be more effective if the Bill were to
become law is flawed.  Proponents believe that the Bill will actually make it
easier for federal judges to compel compliance because “judges will still be able to
hold defendants in contempt, fine officials and their agencies, incarcerate recalci-
329. Id .
330. See generally OSWALD SPENGLER, THE DECLINE OF THE WEST (Charles Francis Atkinson trans.,
Knopf 1962) (1928).
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trant officials, compel explanations and reports . . . .”331  But these are the same
tools available to judges now, and with the proposed time limitations, it is hard
to believe that judges will be able to do more in a more restricted period of time.
Proponents also argue that ongoing consent decrees are needlessly expensive,
but so is the cost of litigation.  The severe temporal limitations and reduced in-
centive to settle will force plaintiffs to litigate through judgment in federal court
and will require defendants to waste valuable resources defending a claim when
they could have spent that time and money in the more productive effort of reach-
ing settlement.  In terms of the legislative goal here, it is counterproductive as it
wrests control over the imposed remedy from the hands of the government
defendant.
Another problem may be the existence of under-funded mandates.  Congress
creates rights under federal law, but oftentimes fails to appropriate the necessary
funds sufficient to ensure that state and local governments may meet those goals.
It is important to remember consent decrees are the product of voluntary agree-
ments between the government and the plaintiff to address one or more viola-
tions of federal rights that have, as a rule, gone un-remedied, in some instances
for years.  If consent decrees are limited by the passage of this Bill, the courts will
undoubtedly be further clogged with individual cases and a multitude of issues
that would be better suited and likely more quickly resolved by a consent decree.
E. The Bill Does Not Necessarily Reflect the Thinking of the
Supreme Court
Proponents of the Bill rely on the decision in Frew v. Hawkins as support
for the proposition that the Bill reflects the thinking of the Supreme Court.332  In
Frew v. Hawkins, Texas State court officials entered into a consent decree ap-
proved by the Federal District Court with many specific proposals to comply with
a Medicaid program aimed at making an early diagnosis of illness and disease in
children.333  For example, the federal statute required states participating in the
program to arrange for the provision of “screening services in all cases where they
are requested,” as well as “corrective treatment.”334  The consent decree directed
the Texas Department of Health to implement toll-free phone numbers so that
aid recipients might arrange for appointments.335  Two years after the consent
decree was entered, petitioners filed a motion to enforce it.  In a unanimous deci-
sion, the court upheld the consent decree stating “federal courts are not reduced to
approving consent decrees and hoping for compliance. Once entered, a consent
331. Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings, supra note 304, at 14 (statement of Prof. Ross Sandler, New
York Law School).
332. Id. at 3 (statement of Michael S. Greve, American Enterprise Institute).
333. 540 U.S. 431 (2004).
334. Id . at 435.
335. Id.
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decree may be enforced.”336  While it is true that the Frew court suggested that
consent decrees should be narrow in scope and return policy decisions to state and
local governments as soon as possible, it was equally concerned with the adequate
enforcement of consent decrees as it was with returning discretion to officials.
The federal court must exercise its equitable powers to ensure that
when the objects of the decree have been attained, responsibility for
discharging the State’s obligations is returned promptly to the State
and its officials.  As public servants, the officials of the State must be
presumed to have a high degree of competence in deciding how best to
discharge their governmental responsibilities.  A State, in the ordinary
course, depends upon successor officials, both appointed and elected, to
bring insights and solutions to problems of allocating revenues and re-
sources.  The basic obligations of federal law may remain the same, but
the precise manner of their discharge may not.  If the State establishes
reason to modify the decree, the court should make the necessary
changes; where it has not done so, however, the decree should be en-
forced according to its terms.337
Notice the court’s emphasis of enforcement and successful compliance as well
as the emphasis on the prompt return of responsibility to defendant.  A court
would ignore such guidance at its peril.  Moreover, no court seeks the continued
drain on its time and resources that enforcement of consent decrees requires.  De-
spite the perception that some politicians have sought to create, there is no epi-
demic amongst federal judges to become proxy to school or prison administrators.
At the end of the day, cases like Benjamin that involve complicated and
ongoing constitutional violations never have, and cannot now, be solved by the
regime required under this Bill.  As an example let’s examine the overcrowding
issue.  Overcrowding is not a discrete problem—jail populations ebb and flow
and can, depending on circumstances, be so great that detainees’ constitutional
rights are violated.  If limitations on consent decrees are not flexible enough to
deal with such a recurring problem, plaintiff detainees will be forced to re-liti-
gate their case each time the jail becomes overcrowded.  This would have been an
untenable situation at Rikers.  It has taken nearly thirty years for the City to
reach substantial compliance in most of the areas covered by the consent decrees,
not the least of which has been population control.  If the Benjamin case had
been subjected to the proposed legislation, there would have been no institutional
memory, many judges would have been involved in serial fashion, and there
would have been a litigation explosion with hundreds of lawsuits.
336. Id. at 440.
337. Id. at 442.
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V. CONCLUSION
The changes that were necessary to protect the constitutional rights of de-
tainees have now been accomplished or are within reach.  While it took consider-
able time and effort by the court and the parties, such changes were unlikely to be
accomplished through legislative action.
Put another way, the fact is that LAS championed prisoners’ rights in the
Federal District Court and their efforts could not have brought the same results
through the legislative process.  The legislature is just not equipped to have repli-
cated the progress or provided the necessary vigilance that have brought our jails
to this juncture, e.g., overcrowding is no longer an issue, attorneys no longer wait
for hours to consult with clients, and attorney visiting rooms are for the first time
private and secure, and on an institutional level, the consent decrees have helped
to maintain and improve the physical plant of the jails and to keep them safe for
human habitation, food services now ensure that detainees are adequately fed
while in custody and that the food is prepared and served in a sanitary
environment.
While courts may be criticized for their oversight role, it is still their respon-
sibility when litigation is brought before them to determine, and where appropri-
ate protect, the constitutional rights of detainees just like the rights of any one of
us.
Clearly consent decrees should not last in perpetuity.  They should be availa-
ble to litigants, but only for an appropriate period of time and factual circum-
stances should dictate when they are to terminate.  For discrete violations, a time
limit for the decree might make sense.  As we have also seen, in certain instances,
a private settlement may work.  Consent decrees are not identical, and arbitrary
time limits on consent decrees, irrespective of individual circumstances may be
counterproductive.
Judges have a duty to protect the rights of those who come before the court
and request relief for cognizable violations of constitutional rights.  “[W]hen peo-
ple came to me and said [‘] my rights have been violated, [’] I couldn’t say [‘] get
lost, [’] or ignore them. I had to decide whether I thought they did make a case or
did not make a case and I decided that [the Rikers detainees in Benjamin] did
make a case and I had to do something about it.”338  Judge Lasker also made the
point that no judge “asks for the cases, no one wants to keep them forever.”339
Some argue that judicial oversight is inefficient because of how busy federal
judges are and while Judge Lasker does not dispute this, he wonders if there
exists a better system that will protect the constitutional rights of pre-trial de-
tainees.  I share his doubts.  There are of course any number of important and
338. Interview with Judge Lasker, supra note 88.
339. Id.
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helpful associations that work towards improving prison conditions, but in the
last analysis, the Judiciary is the only entity that can adequately enforce constitu-
tional protections.  It is important that we allow it to do so.
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